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I. INTROOUCI10N: A GLOBAL PANDEMIC 
On September 8, 1989, a Pannair CV-580 double-engine pas-
senger propeller on route from Oslo, Norway to Hamburg, Ger-
many crashed off the Danish coast, killing 55 people onboard. lt 
remains the deadliest Norwegian aviation disaster to date and even-
tually resulted in the closing of Pannair.t Several investigations all 
pointed to improper maintenance as the primary cause. Most nota-
bly, three of the bolts used to secure the tail section were found to 
be counterfeit products of inferior quality that could not sustain the 
resonant vibration that occurred in the auxiliary power unit.' 
Counterfeiting is a serious problem which transcends borders, 
industries. and consumers. Cars and planes provide two ready ex-
amples. Unapproved or counterfeit pans3 played a role in I 74 air-
craft crashes or less serious accidents from May I 973 through April 
I. PIDnt C"nNd Off Donnh Co<ut Ktlls SS. N.Y. T'"' <. SepL 9. 1%'1. at Al2; 
James 0. Ja.:lson, Trmt Bombs on the Tormnc, T""'• Feb. 7. 1994, at 40. 
2. The Aircraft Accident Investigation lloard/Norway, Rtport on the Conl'air 3401 
580 LN·I'AA Aircraft Acrldtnt North of Nlrt!lw/s, Denmark, on Septem!Jtr 8, 1989. al 
112. avui/ublt at hup~/www.aibn.no/rnppon·02·1993-.:ng·pdrlpid•Nalive·Conlent File· 
Filc&ana<h" I. 
3. The Federal Av,.h<>n Adminisltahon (FAA) defonc, ·counlcrfcll pan<" as: "A 
pan made or ahered to 1m1tate or resemble an appro\-oed pare Without authority or right. 
and with the inlcnt to m1~t~lcad or defraud by passing as original or genuine." FAA 
Advisory Circular 21-29(", Dtttcting and Rtf/orting Susptetttl Unapproved !'arts J(d). 
updalcd Aug. 11. 2011. a•·u11Dblt at hup:llwww.faa.govlain:raft/dratl_docsimedial 
OrafLAC·21-29C-CHG·2.pdf Because not all substandard pans are oounlerfeit per se, 
the FAA rules often combine 1he term c::ountcrfeil with .. unapprm·ed paru ... 'lo defines 
.. unappro,·ed pans- as: .. A pan that doet.. not mee1 the rcqu~rements or an approYed 
part (refer 10 definition of approved paris in •ubparagraph Jb). This tcnn al\o includes 
pa.rts th~H moy fall under one or more of the following categories.: (1) Porb <~hipped 
directly to the user by a manufacturer, supplier, or distributor, where the part,. were not 
produced under the authomy or (and in a<XOrdanec with) an FAA produc110n appro•al 
for !he part (e.g .• prod .... -uon O\emm• .. here the parts d•d not pass through an ap-
pro,'ed quahty system). (2) New parts thai ha>e passed through a PAH's qual11ysystem 
which do not conform to the approved dc\l{tn/data. (3) Part\ that have l.x:cn 1111ention· 
ally misrepresented, including counterfeit ports. 
j 
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1996, resulting in 17 deaths and 39 injuries.• It is estimated that 
there are more than half a million pieces of counterfeit aviation ac-
cessories, parts and/or devices circulating in the global market each 
year, accounting for approximately 2% of the relevant market.5 
These inferior products even found their way on board Air Force 
One, prompting a congressional hearing and major policy adjust· 
ments by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) on outsourc-
ing repair work and foreign inspection.6 Even more troubling, the 
Air Force One incident was by no means unique: counterfeit parts 
even made their way into the Space Shuttle Program.' Turning from 
aviation to ground transportation, the automotive industry esti-
mates that counterfeit parts have resulted in about $16 bi llion losses 
in 2007 alone and the rate is likely to grow 9-11% each year; at least 
20,000 jobs can be created or saved by eliminating counterfeit 
parts.8 So severe is the situation that Congress, as well as both the 
Bush and Obama Administrations, have taken up anti-counterfeit-
ing efforts as one of their top policy priorities.9 
4. Frank Bajak, Plane Ports on Black Markt'.t Plagua Airline Industry, Associate 
Press/Lodi News-Sentinel, Dec. 7. 1996. at 17, available ar http:/lncws.google.oomlnews 
papers?nida2245&dat•l9961206&id~ 7tczAAAA1BAJ&sjid=ViEGAAAAIBAJ&pg% 
6976,4795140. 
5. FAA Advisory CirC<Jiar 21·29C, ill. 
6. Oversight of Foreign Aviation Repair Stations: Hearing before Jhe Subcommitlt!e 
Of! Aviation of the CommiJtu on Commerce, Science and TrtmSp()rtation, 109th Cong. 
96 (2005); su also Danger in lht Repair Shop: FAA lnspec10rs An Warning About tire 
Risks of Outsourcing Maintenance, Bu.\INESS WEEK, July 30, 2007, at 36. 
7. /d. 
8. Just Auto, CowUJtrfeir Car Parts in the Gwbal Auto Industry (July 2008). at I; 
Neal Zipser, Counterfeit Auro PortS: A Growing Industry E-pidemic, 55 Auro INc., No. 
4, Apr. 4, 2007, available aJ hup://www.iccwbo.org/uplo..dedFilcs/BASCAPIPagesl 
Counterreit%20Auto%20Parts%20·%20A %20Growing%20Epidemic.doc. 
9. For example. in the I 12th Congress, Senator Patrick Leahy (D.Vt.), Otairman 
of Committee on the Judiciary. introduced S. 968. Preventing Real Online Threats to 
Economic Creativity and The[t or lntelleclual Property Act or2011 (PROTECT IP Act 
of 2011 ). Section 8 is designed to pre,·ent the importation of counterfeit products and 
infringing devices. This is on top of what Congress has just done in less than three years 
ago. See Prioritizing Resources and Organization for Jntellectual Property Act of2008 
("PRO IP Act"), Pub . .J... No. IICJ.403, 122 Stat. 4256 (2008); cf., S. 3325, £nforcomenr of 
lnrellecttwl Property RighJs Act o/2008, IIOlh Cong., 2nd Sess. (2008). Note that PRO 
I P AcL basically is the codification of the Bush Administration's Slrategy for Targeti11g 
Organized Piracy (STOP!) Initiative, introduced in October 2004. Office or the U.S. 
IPR Coordinalor. Bush Administration Strategy for Targeting Organi:ted Piracy, Ac· 
comp/islmteJIIS and lniliali1·es (Sept. 2007), availnblt 01 hllp://www.stop[akes.gov/pd[/ 
Memo_$TOP _Sheet._September.,.2007.pdr. Su also, Orrice or the U.S. Intellectual 
property Enforcement Coordinator, 2010 Joint StrtJitgic Plan ou lntelltctual Property 
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On the other hand, the prevalence of illicit medicines and vac-
cines has become a major global safety concem.'° For example, the 
U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) reports that between 
the beginning of 2007 and the end of May 2008, 103 Americans died 
after experiencing an allerfic reaction to heparin, a very commonly 
prescribed anticoagulant.' During a 1995 meningitis epidemic in 
Niger, 50,000 people were inoculated with fake vaccines- and 2,500 
died.'2 In 2006, more than 100 Panamanian children died after in-
gesting cough syrup that had been mixed with diethylene glycol, a 
common component of antifreeze.' 3 Separately, the World Health 
Organization estimates that approximately 200,000 people die every 
year from malaria because of poorly produced and inadequately de· 
livered drugs. 14 
Pirates and counterfeiters know no geographic boundaries.'5 
For example, in the late 1970s, farmers in Zaire (now the Demo-
cratic Republic of Congo) and Kenya purchased a significant 
amount of pesticides and antifungals they believed were manufac-
Enforcement (June 2010), availabk at hup://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/defaulll files/ 
omblasselslin<elle<:lualproperty/inlellectualpropertyJiralegic_plan.pdf. 
10. RoGER BAm, MAI(ING A Kn$uNG: Tuc 0EAOI.V I MPLICATIONS 01• T i m ColJN· 
TI' RI·lln DRuG T""""· at 8-24 (2008). 
11. U.S. Federal Food and Drug Administration, Information on Adverse Event Re· 
ports ami Heparin. June 18, 2009, available at hup:/lwww.fda.gov/DrugsiDrugSafety/ 
PostmarketDrugSafetylnformation forPa1ientsand ProvidersiUCM 112669. 
12. Roger Bate, ,)·upra note 10. Granted that it can be difficult at times to clearly 
identify the direct cause or death in light of other possible conrriburing factors, rhe 
statistics here do reflecr cases auriburable to inferior quality medicines. 
13. /d. 
14. /d. 
15. In this article, the terms ''piracy" and ''counterfeit" are used interchangeably. 
Under the definition of Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Protection (TR IPS Agreement), however, "oounterfeit"" applies to trademark goods 
only: .. 'counterfeit trademark goods' shall mean any goods. including packaging, bear· 
ing without authorization a trademark which is identical to the trademark validly regis· 
tered in respect of such goods, or which cannot be distinguished in its essential aspects 
from such a trademark, and which thereby infringes the rights of the owner or the trade· 
mark in question under the law of the country of importation;" whereas "Piracy .. ap· 
plies to copyrighted works: ""pirated oopyright goods" shall mean any goods which are 
copies made without the consen1 of the right holder or person duly authorized by the 
right holder in the country of production and which are made directly or indirectly from 
an article where the making of lhat copy would have constiruted an infringement of a 
copyright or a related right under the law of the country of importation.,. TRIPS Agrte· 
ment. Annex lC to the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization. art. 51, 
note 14. contained in WTO, T111~ LuiAI. Tf:>:x-rs: Tm:; R1:'.Sut:rs OJ· '1'111~ URUC.ltAY 
RouNJ> o•· MtH .TII.A"Il·RAI~ TRAm: Nl'.( iOTIA.l'IONS (2007). at 342. C/. MrCAR'IliY·s 
DhSK EN<"·vci.Ot>I;I)IA oP IN'll:l.t.I:!CrtJAI PMO!>Il RTY, (3rd ed. 2004). at 451. 
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tured by the Chevron Corporation. However, they in fact received 
counterfeit Taiwanese products that contained only chalk.' 6 As a 
result, the harvest for one of the most important crops of those two 
nations - coffee - was reduced by about 67% in 1979 and 1980, 
causing devastating socio-economic damage to the region. 17 The 
purchase of counterfeit agricultural products is not Limited to devel-
oping countries or gullible consumers. In 2004, an almost identical 
episode occurred once agail1 in Western Europe, ruining thousands 
of acres of farmland in southern France, Italy and Spain. So serious 
was the situation that the European Crop Protection Association 
(ECPA) called for immediate actions from the European Commis-
sion to combat counterfeit pesticides.'8 
In the copyright area, a survey by a copyright trade group esti-
mated that illegal or unauthorized downloads of music exceeded 
more than 20 billion times in 2005, causing devastating damages to 
the music industry.'9 It put the losses at more than $58 billion in 
the U.S. market alone in 2006, destroying close to 380,000 jobs. In 
the computer software sector, while the rate of piracy seems to have 
stabilized somewhat in recent years, thanks in part to the introduc-
tion of different marketing method (such as bundling software with 
hardware) and anti-circumvention or technical protectton mea-
16. CatO!itropllic Crop Fa/hut Caused by Fake Pesticide, BusinessWeek, Dec. 16, 
l985. at64. cited by and at 4 M<(:AJnllv o..." TRADEMARKS AND UNJO"J\IR CoMPE'l1TrON' 
§ 25.10 (4th ed. 2008). 
17. ltL 
18. Eu.ropean Crop Protection Industry Strongly Supports Anti·cotmterfeil Measuns 
by Aulhorilits atJd Others. EuROPI!AN CoRP P •uJnK'TION Assocr.A.TION Nt:ws R F..-
I.I•.ASo·., March 29, 2007, available at http~lwww.ecpa.belwehsitelpage.asp?mi=l&cust=3 
&lang:en&ne~L6139. For a detailed analysis, see ECPA, Counterfeit Pesticides 
Across Europe- 2008: Facts, Co11sequmces and Actions Needed (August?, 2008), at 11 , 
available at http~lwww.ecpa.eu!filcs/gavin/17853_Counterfeit%20Pesticides%20across 
%20Europe%20.%20 Facts-Consequences%20ond%20Actions%20needed.p<lf; Busi-
ness Action to Stop Counterfeiting and Piracy (BASCA P), International Cloamber of 
Commerce, Perilous Pestkld<S, February I, 2008, available at http:l/www.icc-ccs.oo.uk/ 
bascaplarticle.php?articleid~7S2. 
19. Stephen E. Siwek, The True Cosr of CopyrightlndttStry Piracy to the U.S. &on· 
omy. INsnTun:!. FOJ~ Poucv INNOVATION Poucv RHI"'RT No. 189 (2007), at 11 , avail· 
obit at http~/www.copyrightalliance.org/filesl siwekoopyrightpiracy_studyp<lf.p<lf; 
lmemational Piracy - The Orallmges of Protecting lmellectua/ Property in the 21st Ctn· 
tury: Hearing before the Subcommiuee on Courts, the Internet, tmd the lmellectual Prop-
erty, U.S. House of Represelllatives, I lOth Cong. (2007)(Statement or Eric H. Smith, 
President. International Intellectual Property Alliance). 
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sures, total losses still grew significantly along with the overall mar-
ket expansion, to a record $58.8 billion in 2010.20 
Piracy and counterfeiting sales have become a means to fi· 
nance organized crime and terrorism. In 2003, a congressional hear· 
ing established the relationship between international piracy and 
terrorist financing for the first time.21 The testimony of the General 
Secretary of INTERPOL provided the first confirmation that 
paramilitary groups in Northern Ireland, ethnic Albanian extremist 
groups in Kosovo, Chechen separatists, North African radical fun-
damentalist groups and Al·Qaeda are all involved, directly or indi-
rectly, in piracy or counterfeiting businesses, raising millions of 
dollars a year.22 
With the globalization of trade and aid of modern technolo· 
gies, piracy and counterfeiting can occur as soon as the original 
work is available on the market.23 Tills allows counterfeiters to bet-
ter coordinate their activities so they can avoid legal consequences 
in different nations, thereby posting serious challenges to the ex· 
isting international intellectual property protection regime.24 Ad· 
20. Business Software Alliance. 2010 Eigluh Annual BSA Global Software Piracy 
Study (2011 ), at 2. 
21. lntelleaua/ Property Crime1: Are Proued$from Counterfeited Goods 1-Unding 
Terrorism?: Hearing before the Commiuu on fnttrnorional Relations, U.S. House of 
Representativ~. 108th Cong. 1st Sess. (2003). 
22. /d.,at 13-16 (Statement of Ronald K. Noble, Secretary Genen>l of INTERPOL). 
In the case of AI·Qaeda, the estimate is that it received between US$300 million and 
US$.500 million over a ten year period, averaging US$30 million to US$50 million a 
year. Of this amount, approximately 10% of spending went on operations white 90% 
was used to mainlain and expand the infrastructure or the group's network. 
23. An example is the theatrical rele,asc of The Star War.f: Episodt! I on May 19. 
1999 in the U.S. market. Pirated DVDs were discovered in Singapore on May 24. and 
then quickly spread through the entire Asia-Pacific region. Within a week, just when 
the Asian local theaters were about to ha,•e their release. the market was already 
flooded with various pirated versions. Mindful thai rhis happened even before the In-
ternet download speed was high enough to allow far more efficient copying and distri-
bution seen today. Sou roe of survey: Motion Pictures Association. 
24. An illustralion for this problem is the Kazaa lirigation around the world. First 
developed in 2001 primarily for free (i.e .. unauthorized or unlicensed) peer-to-peer mu-
sic download, it quickly attracted a large following and not surprisingly, law suits from 
the music industry. Because this service had been located and relocated in Estonia, the 
Netherlands, Australia, a11d eventually in Vanuatu. together with change of ownership, 
they all makes a pure legal solution all the more diffic-ult and lenglhy. Different c-ourts 
have indeed reached different conclusions, which only exacerbate the prospect of a 
more harmonized enforcement and interpretation of the law. Eliza Shardlow Clark, 
Note, Online Music Slwring ;, a Global Economy: The U.S. Effon 10 Command (or 
Survive) the Tidal Wave, 14 MoNN. J. Go.OBAL TRADI' 141, 150·153 (2004-05). 
PIRACY AND ANTJ·COUNTERFEITING STRATEGIES 7 
justing quickly with the changing markets, piracy and counterfeiting 
businesses have evolved from more individualized, ad !Joe opera-
tions some twenty or thirty years ago into a highly diverse and so-
phisticated underground economy today, with systemic capital 
injections, organized product distribution channels and profit 
sharing.25 
Given that no single country is immune from the plague of 
piracy and that no domestic solution will suffice to tackle this prob-
lem, one would think that a natural and proper response ought to 
be for the international community to forge a cohesive alliance to 
deal with global piracy. Indeed they tried. Ironically, the processes 
and the various solutions being proposed only turned into some of 
the most controversial flash points that further enhance conflicts 
and polarize the so-called North and South division, to be discussed 
infra. Arguably this creates more breeding grounds for economic 
pirates to flourish. This article intends to examine the current state 
of the play, with focus on the interactions around some of the most 
recent developments, such as the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agree-
ment (ACTA) and the still on-going Trans-Pacific Partnership 
Agreement (TPPA) negotiations. The article comments that the 
ideological split that has plagued the international community and 
argues that both ACT A and TPPA are likely to cause deeper mis-
trust between developed and developing economies, and create 
huge seismic conflicts among different trade blocs. While the need 
for a solid legislative and enforcement regime on the protection of 
intellectual property rights is necessary to sustain healthy economic 
growth and the development of science and technology, the heavy-
banded "legalistic approach" and closed-door, "country club" style 
negotiations, as suggested by one observer, ironically, are likely to 
make matters worse before the situation gets better.26 This article 
argues that a kinder, gentler, and more incremental approach with a 
focus on licensing reform and on complementary managerial and 
25. Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Th• Eco· 
nomic Impact ofCounterf•icing and Piracy (Pan IV)(2007), at3. Stratifications on pric-
ing based on different qualities of different oounterfeit goods are 110w a common scene 
in many outlets or bazaars around the world particularly famed or notorious for selling 
those types ol products, with finely printed catalogues available for the better quality 
(dubbed "AAA" or "AA" respectively) as if ~leY are genuine goods. 
26. Because the negotiations of the ACfA and TPPA are all "by invitation only," 
and in light of the secrerive nalure of the content or the negotiations, critics have re-
ferred to this style as "country club" negotiations. See Peter K. Yu, ACTA and Its 
Complu Policies, 3 WI PO Journal I (2011), available at hllp1/papers.ssm.oom/sol31 
papers.cfm?abstract_ida 1953899. 
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technological measures should be a far better alternative, and the 
international community, especially developing and less developed 
economies, should focus on their long term gains as opposed to the 
short term losses and tackle this issue as a priority of their national 
policies. 
U. INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIES AND 
CONTROVERSIES 
Sensing the magnitude of the counterfeit and piracy problems 
on hand, nations around the world are trying to come together to 
tackle the issues in a more cohesive manner. Many existing interna-
tional organizations indeed tried to take the lead27 However, the 
efforts of these organizations have produced rather mixed results 
thus far and controversies flared up constantly between the devel-
oped and less developed economies, rendering the coordination on 
enforcement inefficient and arguably ineffective.28 
As a result, intellectual property issues were put on the agenda 
of the 08 Summit in 2005 and have been featured prominently ever 
since. During the 2005 summit, while the participants tried to fig-
ure out a more effective way to deal with the issue, perhaps even 
completely by-passing the existing international organizations all 
together, Japan first proposed the creation of a new international 
framework to combat counterfeit and pirated products, thus mark-
ing the beginning of the negotiations concerning the Anti-Counter-
1:1. For instance, WI PO held a number of diplomatic <:Onfereooes covering a wide 
range or issues. from lntcrnet·related copyright, industrial designs, substanlive patent 
hannonitation, among other things. Other organizations such as Interpol. WCO and 
WHO also engaged in addressing the piracy and counterfeit issues. See, for example, 
Ronald K. Noble, Bridging Boundaries for Shared So/wions, Remarks for the 5th 
Global Congress on Combating Counterfeiting and Piracy at Cancun, Mexico. Decem-
ber I. 2009 available at https://secure.interpol.inlfPubliciiCPO/speechesf20091SGCoun 
terfeitingMexico20091208.asp?HM=l (Mr. Noble was the Secretary General of Interpol 
at the time). 
28. The WtPO efforts produced results such as the Trademark Law Treaty in 1994, 
WI PO Copyright Treaty and WI PO Performances and Phonograms Treaty in 1996, Ge-
neva Act of the Hague Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Indus--
trial Designs in 1999, Patent Law Treaty of 2000. Singapore Treaty on the Law of 
Trademarks in 2006 that are now all in effect. Several others. such as the 2012 Beijing 
Treaty on Audiovisual Performances are still waiting for nations to sign up and the drah 
Substantive Patent Law Treaty is s1ill.io discussions and limbo. With regard lOa com•eo-
tion or treaty design to combat directly against piracy and oountetfeit, that was never 
materialized. See irJfro for more discussions. 
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feiting Trade Agreement (ACT A).29 This was particularly viewed 
as necessary among the developed economies, given that the WTO 
Doha Round multilateral trade negotiations bad been (and still is) 
in a stalemate and many nations and/or custom unions have been 
engaged in negotiations for free trade agreements (FT As) or trade 
and investment framework agreements (TIFAs) to ensure their re-
spective competitiveness, protections and global positions. In this 
context, these nations believe a new regime such as ACT A can cer-
tainly help gain the political and economic high ground to solidify 
its market positions. But acting as a prelude, the following is a state 
of play of what has happened on the international front that even-
tually evolves into what it is today: 
A. Global Congress Combating Counterfeiting and Piracy 
(GCCCP) 
The WCO and INTERPOL first jointly launched the GCCCP 
in 2002 and subsequently won the support of the WIPO. The organ-
ization's first conference was held in Brussels in 2004. It is man-
aged by a steering group composed of representatives from 
BASCAP Initiative of ICC, International Trademark Association 
(INT A), and International Security Management Association 
(ISMA).30 
Originally designed to be a forum for the exchange of view-
points and experience-sharing, it sometimes produces quite remark-
able propositions in their Outcome Statement (OS) issued at the 
conclusion of each Global Congress, unlike ordinary diplomatic 
communiques, and, therefore, can sometimes be quite forthright 
and controversial. For example, in 2008, the OS (also known as 
Dubai Declaration) made a list of 33 specific recommendations, 
covering areas such as cooperation and coordination, legislation 
and enforcement, capacity building, awareness raising, health and 
safety risks, free trade zones and transshipment and sale of counter-
feit and pirated products over the lnternet.31 In particular they 
29. U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). Joim P"ss Statement of the Anti·C<>tmttr· 
feitit~g Trade Agreement Negotiating Parties. October I, 2011, available at http://www. 
ustr.gov/about-uslpress-ortice/press-releasesl 2011/octobcr/joint""Press-statement-anti-
counterreiting-trade-ag. 
30. For general introduction of this forum, .u.e http:/fwww.ccapcongrcss.net/. 
31. GCCCP, Dubai Declaration (Outcome Statement), February 3·5, 2008, http:// 
www.ccapeongress.nelfarchives/Oubai/Files/Finai%20Dubai%200utoomes%20Decla-
ration.pdf. The Dubai Congress also marked the first time this group had its conference 
held outside or Europe. 
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called on Internet service providers (ISPs) to take more aggressive 
actions, including the adoption of better filtering system th rough 
technological means, to police Internet traffic and screen out in-
fringing information.32 
In addition, GCCCP has become one of the most active organi-
zations in sponsoring numerous educational professional training 
and other public awareness programs around the world. But its ac-
tivities have ironically stimulated the so-called North-South dispute 
(more discussions infra). 
B. World Health Organization (WHO)IIMPACT! 
After more than a decade of debates and discussions, and in 
accordance with the World Health Assembly (WHA) Resolutions 
41.16 of 198833 and 47.13 of 199334, WHO finally issued the Guide-
lines for the Development of Measures to Combat Counterfeit Drugs 
in 1999.35 The guidelines specifically emphasize the shared respon-
sibility among different government agencies, pharmaceutical in-
dustries, distributors, health professionals, consumers and the 
general public, as well as the international dimension that requires 
regional and global cooperation.36 
Unlike general consumer goods where there may be a "secon-
dary market" of buyers who purchase goods knowing of their infer-
ior quality and counterfeit nature, consumers who purchase a 
pharmaceutical product expect it to have the medical effect of heal-
ing their illness. In light of the more serious problems created by 
counterfeit pharmaceutical products and to follow-up on the imple-
mentation of the 1999 Guidelines, the WHO convened a conference 
entitled Combating Counrerfeil Drugs: Building Effective Interna-
32. /d. 
33. The World Health Assembly (WHA) in Ihis Resolution requesled lhe WHO 
Director~General, ittter alia, "to initiate programmes for the prevention and detection 
of lhe export, import and smuggling of falsely labelled, spurious, counterfeit or substan 4 
dard pharmaceutical preparations. and to cooperate with the Secretary·General of the 
United Nations in such cases when provisions of the international drug treaties are 
violated." 
34. The WHA in this Resolution requested the Director·Oeneral, imer alia, ''to sup~ 
port Member States in their efforts to ensure that available drugs are of good quality. 
and in combating the use of counterfeit drugs:· 
35. WHO Department of Essential Drugs and Other Medicines, Counterfeit Drugs: 
Guiddines for the Developmem of Measures to Combat Counterfeit Drugs, WHOIEDM/ 
QSM/99.1 (1999). available at hnp:l/whqlibdo<:.who.inllhqi1999/WHO_EDM_0SM_99. 
I. pdf. 
36. /d. 
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tiona/ Collaboration in Rome on February 18, 2006, and issued the 
Declaration of Rome at its conclusion37 The Declaration explicitly 
states that: 
"Counterfeiting medicines, including the entire range of 
activities from manufacturing to providing them to pa-
tients, is a vile and serious criminal offence that puts 
human lives at risk and undermines the credibility of 
health systems."38 
Building on the principles and recommendations laid out in 
this Declaration, the WHO Secretariat assembled the International 
Medical Products Anti-Counterfeiting Task Force (IMPACT!) and 
a Secretariat for this voluntary group to carry out the mandates 
from the Rome conference.39 IMP ACT! aims at ensuring appropri-
ate regional representation, particularly from developing countries. 
Five working groups have been established to tackle legislative and 
regulatory infrastructure, implementation, enforcement, technol-
ogy, and communication, respectively.40 A new group on medical 
37. WHO, Conclusions and Recommendations of the Who lnremationol Conferena 
on Combatlng Counterfeit Medicines: Declaration of Rome (February IS. 2006), m:aila~ 
ble at hnp://www.who.int/ medicines/serviceslcountcrfeit/RomeDeclaration.pdL With 
regard to the rationale for the establishment of IMPACfl,see WHO, Combating Corm-
terfeit Drugs: A O:mcept Paper for Effective lnterootionol Collabormion (J2u1uary 27. 
2006), availabl• at hup:/lwww.who.inllmedicineslevenls/FINALBACK PAPER.pdf. 
38. /d. 
39. WHO, lmemational Medical ProduCIS Allli-Co~mterfeiting Task Force, http:!/ 
www.who.inllimpactlenl. The task force is composed of delegateS [rom the following 23 
governmental and non-governmental organizations: INTERPOL. OECD,WCO, 
WIPO, WfO. European Commission, Council of Europe, U.S. Pharmacopoeia, the 
CommonweaJLh Secretariat. Association of Southeast Asian Secretariat, International 
Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers and Associations. International Genedc 
Pharmaceuticals Alliance, World Self-Medication Industry, Associaci6n Latinoameri-
cana de lndustrias Farmaceuticas. International Federation of Phannaoeutical Whole-
salers, E.uropean Association of Pharmaceutical Full-line Wholesales, International 
Pharmaceutical Federation, International Council of Nurses~ World Medical Associa-
tion. Pharmaceutical Security Institute, Pharmaciens sans frontiers (ReMeD), and In· 
ternational Alliance or Patients' Organizations. See also WHO Working Group on 
Substandard/Spurious/ Falsely·Labelled/Falsified/Counlerfeit Medical Products. IV flO's 
Relationship with the JmernatiotUJl Medical Products Anti~CowuerfeiJlng Taskforce, N 
SSFFC/W0/4 (February 7, 2011). available at http://apps.who.inllgblssffclpdLfiiC$/A_ss 
FFC_ WG4-en.pdf. 
40. WHOIIMPAcn,Jnrernalionol Medical Products Anri-Counterfeiring Taskforce 
(JM PACT) T_,ms of Reference. available at http://www.who.inllentily/impacllaboui/IM-
PACf_ToR.pdf. From 2006 10 2008, the IMPACT! Secrelariat"s funding amoonted to 
approximately US$ 23 million. Major contributors included EU, Australia, Germany, 
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devices may be established in the future.•• 
Through these working groups, a number of principles and 
guidelines have been developed and issued to promote a unified 
approach to deal with counterfeit drugs, covering such issues as na-
tional legislation, data collection tools, sampling strategy, rapid re-
sponse, good security practices for printed packaging material, good 
distribution practices, and single point of contact.42 Some of the 
most important guidelines are the Principles and Elements for Na· 
tiona/ Legislation against Counterfeit Medical Products, endorsed by 
IMPACT! in 2007.43 The principles take a very broad approach in 
defining what constitutes the manufacturing and distribution of 
counterfeit medicines in the entire supply chain: A medical product 
is counterfeit when there is a false representation in relation to its 
identity, history or source."" Counterfeits may include products 
with correct ingredients/components, with wrong ingredients/com-
ponents, without active ingredients, with incorrect amounts of ac-
tive ingredients, or those with fake packaging.45 
As a result, any person or legal entity that produces medical 
products, or engages in any step of the process of producing medi-
cal products, including purchasing of materials, processing, assem· 
bling, packaging, labeling, storing, sterilizing, as weU as testing and 
releasing the medical product or any component or ingredient, all 
fall under the counterfeit definition and shaU be criminally liable, 
Italy and the Netherlands. See WHO's Relationship wilh the IMPACT!, supra note 39. 
at 6. 
41. Summary Report of the Third IMPACT General Meeting. December 3-5,2008 
at Hammamet, Tunisia, availoble at: http:l/www.who.intlimpactlresources/IM PACfthird 
generalmeeting_ %20rcporLpdf. 
42. WHO's Rtlatioruhip, id., at 9· 13 (Annex). 
43. Principles and Eltmtnts for Nariono/ L~gislation ogoin.st Counterfeit Medical 
Products (December 12, 2007), ovailable at http://www.who.int/impactlevent$1Final· 
PrinciplcsforLegislation.pdf. 
44. /d., at 4. 
45. /d .. In comparison with the 19921FPMA-WHO definition of "counterfeit," the 
scope in this new definition is sig1lificanrly broadened: the subject macter is expanded 
from medicines to all medical products. and no deliberate and fraudulent intent is nec-
essary. Thus false misrepresentation in and of itself. regardless of intent, may be suffi· 
cient to establish counterfeiting. It follows that a drug with concct quality and active 
ingredients but incorrect label may still be deemed and liable as counterfeit drug. See 
WHO Division or Drug management and Policies. CounJerfeil Drugs: Report of A 
WHOIIFPMA IVor~hop, WHO/DMP/CFD/92 (1·3 Aprill992, Geneva), at l,ovailable 
at hllp://whqlibdoc.who.intlhq/1992 /WHO_DMP _CFD_92.pdf. Note, also, that no def. 
inition or illustration was given to the meaning of "history" in terms of false 
representation. 
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even if committed by negligence. Similar liability also applies to 
operators (including sales agents or representatives or wholesalers), 
other operators, or retailers of the supply or distribution chain.46 
Critics argue that the IMP ACf! Principles did not reference 
the WHO 1999 Guidelines as a basis for its work.47 While the 1999 
Guidelines regarded the high price of legal drugs as an important 
contributing factor to the proliferation of counterfeit drugs, IM-
PACf! did not take drug prices into account as a factor behind 
counterfeiting.48 Rather, it held that inadequate regulation and en-
forcement contributes to counterfeiting. Hence, there is a need for 
the development of a set of principles which establish appropriate 
legislation and penal sanctions including a clear definition of coun-
terfeit medicines.49 
Emphasizing the need to address counterfeit medicine issues 
through inteUectual property protection, enforcement, along with 
pharmaceutical and medical devices regulation and criminal law, 
IMP ACf! adopted a one-size-fits-all model legislation as opposed 
to the WHO's traditional emphasis on the need for a national as-
sessment of the current situation as the basis for a national strategy 
with regard to counterfeit medicines.50 Developing economies are 
particularly concerned about the expanded usage of the term 
"counterfeit" from the trademark into the patent arena and the 
omission of "intent" as a prerequisite for potential liability. As a 
result, in 2008, the definition of "counterfeit" was revised: 
A medical product is counterfeit when there is a false rep-
resentation in relation to its identity and/or source. This 
applies to the product, its container or other packaging or 
labeling information. Counterfeiting can apply to both 
branded and generic products. Counterfeits may include 
products with correct ingredients/components, with wrong 
ingredients/ components, without active ingredients, with 
incorrect amounts of active ingredients, or with fake 
packaging. 
46. /d., at 9. 
47. Southern Center and Center for International Environmental Law, Comuerfeil 
Mt!dicat Products: Nud for Caution against OJ~opting Publlc Heaftlr Concerns for IP 
Protection and Enforcemt!nl, IN'll•LU.:.<i'\JAL PRoPI~RTY QuAR·n~RI v UP1)A'riJ (1st 
Quarter 2009), at 2, available aJ hltp~/www.ciel.org/PublicaLions/l P _ Update_ I Q09.pdf. 
48. /d. 
49. /d. 
50. /d. 
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Violations or disputes concerning patents must not be con-
fused with counterfeiting of medical products. Medical 
products (whether generic or branded) that are not au-
thorized for marketing in a given country but authorized 
elsewhere are not considered counterfeit. Substandard 
batches of, or quality defects or non-compliance with 
Good Manufacturing Practices/Good Distribution Prac-
tices (GMP/GDP) in legitimate medical products must not 
be confused with counterfeiting.s1 
While the first sentence retains the same language from the 
2007 text, explanatory footnote 1 was added to "false representa· 
tion," declaring that "[c]ounterfeiting is done fraudulently and de-
liberately. The criminal intent and/or careless behaviour shall be 
considered during the legal procedures for the purposes of sanc-
tions imposed."s2 Critics have suggested that, while this seems to 
reintroduce the element of "intent" as in the 1992 IFPMA· WHO 
definition, when read with the main part of the definition itself, this 
explanation implies that any act of counterfeiting as defined here is 
necessarily done with deliberate and fraudulent intent. Hence, it 
presumes the existence of criminal intent, which has to be rebutted 
by the defendant, and is contrary to normal criminal procedures 
where the burden of proving intent lies with the prosecution.s3 
Because of tbis broad definition and the expanded application 
of intellectual property rights, several other questions have been 
raised. For example: 
1. Whether any off-patent generic medicine can nevertheless 
be treated as counterfeit if it bears a similarity to the color 
scheme, shape, smell or taste of another medicine, even if 
the generic medicine is of good quality, safe and 
efficacious? 
2. Whether a generic formulation which contains correct in-
gredients and is therefore of good quality, safe and effica-
cious will nevertheless be considered counterfeit if it 
contains any misleading statement about the country of or-
igin of the product or its ingredients? 
51. WHO, Secwariat Repon to the /24th Execwive Board Session, 1 10 (at 2-3) 
available at hup://www. who.inlldg/$peeches/2.()()91e:cecwive_boardJeport_)0090 119/en/ 
index.luml. 
52. td., foo1no1e I. 
53. See supra nole 47. a1 4. 
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3. Whether the requirement for international cooperation 
under the Principles in effect amounts to giving the cus-
toms authority of any Member State the power to seize the 
shipment of suspected generic medicines in transit even 
though the destination of the shipment was not that Mem-
ber State and the medicines are off-patents? 
Critics have pointed out that from a short-term public health 
perspective, the fundamental issue is not willful misrepresentation 
but whether such misrepresentation jeopardizes a patients' hea/th.54 
Most of the world's poor quality drugs are not classified as "coun-
terfeit" because "deliberate" and "fraudulent" misrepresentation is 
extremely difficult to prove, and because many poor quality drugs 
are byproducts of ignorance or carelessness in manufacturing or 
distribution. 55 On the other hand, there is a legal distinction to be 
made between a substandard drug that is not the product of good 
manufacturing practice (GMP) and a counterfeit drug. One is the 
consequence of carelessness, the other of outright fraud. But the 
Principles somehow propose to treat them as equal and subject to 
tbe same liabilities. Criminal negligence, for example, would 
render substandard production "counterfeiting," whereas mere 
carelessness would not. Monitoring and maintaining drug quality 
remains tbe responsibility of the inspectorates and enforcement 
agencies of individual member states. But while IMPACT! recom-
mends that member states pursue aggressive campaigns against 
counterfeiting, it is notably silent about what, if anything, should be 
done to combat substandard medicines.56 
In other words, the heavy-banded and expanded application of 
laws and/or enforcement on medical products whose patents are al-
ready expired has created controversies and may jeopardize what is 
supposed to be a genuine, concerted effort among all nations to 
effectively curtail the international proliferation of counterfeit 
drugs. The shifting burden of proof with respect to intent and the 
lack of distinction between "counterfeit" and "substandard" drugs 
only creates more suspicion among developing economies and 
54. Roger Bate ond Karen Porter. IMPACTs Impact, AMI"Rif'.AN EN'n·-RPRISI~ IN. 
S"I1Tlrrt (AEI) Pul\uC HP.A1.111 0UTI.OOK (February 2009). available at http://www. 
aei.org/doeLib/1 mpact.pdl. 
55. /d. 
56. /d. Another criticism is that the lack of distinction between counterfeit and 
expljcitly poor...quality drugs has led to some allegations of connicts of interest~ cspe-. 
cially the involvement of several major pharmaceutical trade associations in the en· 
forcement efforts. 
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makes it more difficult to present a united international front 
against potentially dangerous drugs. 57 Regrettably there is no cred-
ible empirical evidence on just how significant a portion this type of 
"good quality," patent-expired generic drug or other medical prod-
ucts exists that border on potential trademark infringement and 
how they are distributed.58 Many developing economies cast seri-
ous doubt on the usage of intellectual property enforcement alone 
or as the primary tool against counterfeit drugs.59 But one thing is 
clear: without sustained international cooperation, the flood of 
counterfeit drugs is not likely to abate, and the ones who suffer the 
most may well be the very nations who refused to take serious ac-
tions against this problem.60 
C. International Criminal Pollee Organization (ICPO-
INTE RPOL) 
At its 69th General Assembly in 2000, the International Crimi-
nal Police Organization (!CPO-INTERPOL) formally resolved to 
incorporate intellectual property crimes as one of its areas of opera-
tion, and formed the INTERPOL Intellectual Property Crimes Ac· 
tion Group (IIPCAG).61 In May 2004, IIPCAG joined the World 
Customs Organization in co-sponsoring the first GCCCP in Brus-
sels, Belgium. One of its major tasks is to develop intellectual prop-
erty crime investigation training materials and modules for the 
51. The viewpoints rrom developing economies.. represented primarily by Braz.il 
and India, can be reflected. for example. at WHO's ''Counterfeit" Programme: Ltgi-
timises IP Enforcemem Agenda, Umkrminrs Public 1/ea/th, THIRD WoRw Nt..TWORK 
BRtEI'lNO P .. wER 2, available 111 hup:llwww.twnside.org.sg/title21brie£ing_paperslnon 
twn!Briefing.paper.on.WHO.Counterfeits.pdf. 
58. E.g., Rama Lakshmi. India's Market in Generic Drugs Also Leads to Counter· 
feiting, Washington Post, September II. 2010, at A9, avai/abk at hnp://www.wash· 
ingtonpost.comlwp-dynfcontenl/article/20101 091101AR2010091003435.html (Estimates 
vary on the number of these drugs made in India. The government puts the country's 
counterfeit drugs at 0.4 percent and estimates substandard drugs account for about 8 
percent, but independent estimates range from 12 to 25 percent). 
59. See supra note 54, 
60. /d. See also India Leads the IVay with Generic Drugs But as a Sad Side Effect 
They Are Also Leading the Way with Illegal Counrerfeit Drugs, MEDIC'.AI. QuAC'K, Sep-
tembet t9, 2010, available at2010 WLNR 18615303. 
61. As of 2011, this g10up consists or 33 representatives, ranging !rom 15 law en-
forcement authorities in Europe, North America. and China, 2 international organiza. 
tions (WCO and WI PO), 10 industry groups or intellectual property protection entities 
and 3 individual companies (Mtcrosoft Corporation, Procter & Gamble and Underwrit· 
crs Laboratories), respectively. 
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INTERPOL Intellectual Property Crime Investigators CoUege.62 It 
also serves to promote government-private industry and regional 
enforcement cooperation against intellectual property crimes by or-
ganizing regional conferences and training programs.63 
In February 2008, INTERPOL formally launched a Database 
on lnternationallntellectual Property (DllP) to integrate with and 
expand on, but not to replace or substitute, all relevant and existing 
intellectual property databases.64 Data contained in the database 
will be subjected to criminal analysis to identify links between 
transnational and organized cross-industry sector lP criminal activ-
ity. The database will also facilitate criminal investigations and aid 
in developing regional and global strategic IP crime reports.M The 
database also serves as a central point for private industry world-
wide to provide information on inteJJectual property crimes. To-
gether with the Recommended Minimum Global Standard for the 
CoJJection of Information on Counterfeiting and Piracy by the Pri-
vate Sector,66 it should ensure better enforcement cooperation 
among its members.67 The management and maintenance of tills 
database is in the hands of the InteJJectual Property Crime Unit 
under INTERPOL. INTERPOL does not disclose information 
contained in DIIP. Participating industries receive feedback in the 
form of referrals indicating that two or more industries are being 
targeted by the same transnational organized criminals.68 
62. INTERPOL, Fact Shet!l 011 ftutllectuo/ Properly Crime. available at hllp:l/www. 
interpol.inJl contenlldownload1804166551version/9/lile/FHTO l.pdf. 
63. /d. 
64. INTERPOL Media Release. INTERPOL Launches lnte/I«Jual Properry Crime 
Database at Conference in India, February 26, 2008, htiJYllwww.interpol.int/News-and-
media!News-media ... releases/2008/PR006. Note~ howe\--er, this system is separated and 
independent from ~te tmditional INTERPOL Criminal Information System (!CIS). In 
the actual enrorccment. data retrieved from these two systems can be cross·refcrenccd 
and matched to aid the identification of potential targets and the direction of 
investigation. 
65. /d. 
66. INTERPOL, Recommended Minimum Global Stand11rd for the Colkction of In· 
formation on Counterfeiting atJd Piracy by the Private Sector (2008). avDilable at hUps:ll 
www.intcrpol.inJ/Pub~c/ FinanciaiCrime/lntellectualProperly/OliP/ExplanNotes.asp. 
67. It has orten occurred in the past that companies or stakellolders of intellectual 
property rights railed to provide critical inform arion while engaging in cross·border en+ 
forcement efforts, rendering the necessary collaboration all the more difficult. ,1is 
Recommended Standard should help reduce the redundancy and/or the reoonstruction 
of information. 
68. See supra note 64. 
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In addition to the database, in 2006 INTERPOL launched a 
long-term, worldwide anti-counterfeiting campaign (with respect to 
trademarks) dubbed "Operation Jupiter." As of September 30, 
2010, a total of 340 operations have been conducted, resulting in 
629 arrests and seizure of goods worth more than US$50 mill ion.69 
The campaign is continuing and wi ll be focusing on the fight against 
transnational organized intellectual property crime. 
D. World Customs Organization (WCO) 
The WCO does not have international enforcement authority. 
Therefore, its primary function is to coordinate and assist its mem-
bers to improve the effectiveness of their enforcement efforts and 
achieve a balance between control and facilitation.70 The WCO 
also developed instruments for international co-operation in the 
form of the revised Model Bilateral Agreement on Mutual Customs 
Assistance (MBA)". the Nairobi Convention,?' which provides for 
mutual administrative assistance in the prevention, investigation 
and repression of Customs offenses, and the Johannesburg Conven-
tion,73 which provides for mutual administrative assistance in cus-
toms matters. The WCO's Customs COntrol and Enforcement 
Program aims to promote effective enforcement practices and en-
courage co-operation among its members and with its various com-
petent partners and stakeholders. In the area of intellectual 
property, two permanent units were established to expand border 
69. INTERPOL Intellectual Property Rights Programme. Operation Jupiter - The 
Results Keep Rising. IPR NEws (Autumn 2010), at 1-2, available at https://www.in · 
terpol.int!Public/FinanciaiCrime/Intellectual PropertynPRnews/2010/news2010_02.pdf. 
70. WCO, Enforamenl and Compliance - Overview. available at http://www. 
wcoomd.org/home_ epoverviewboxes_cpoverview.htm. 
71. WCO, Model Bilateral AgreemenJ on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Cus-
IOms Mailers: Introduction, Text and Comme.tJIIJry (revised as of June 2<X>4), available at 
httpJiwww. wroomd.orglfilesl I. %20Public%20files/PDFandDocuments/Recommenda-
tions/Model%20agreement.pdf. 
72. lntcrnationaJ Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance for the Preven-
tion, Investigation. and Repression of Customs Offences. CQncluded at Narobi, Kenya 
on June 9, 1977. 1547 U.N.T.S. 444 (1989), available at http://www.wcoomd.org/filesl 
I. %20Public%20filesJPD FandDocuments/Conventionslnaireng %5B I %5D.pdf. 
73. lntema~ional Convention on Mutual Administrative Assislanre in Customs 
Mauers. concluded at Brussels, Belgium on June 27, 2003, available m httpJ/www. 
wcoomd.org/files/1. %20Public%20filesl PDFandDocuments/Conventions/Johannes 
burg_Convention_e ng.pdf. 
PIRACY AND ANTI·COUNTERFEITINO STRATEGIES 19 
control collaborations: The IPR Strategic Group and the IPR Cus-
toms Experts Group.74 
Tn 2006, the WCO attempted to implement a set of Provisional 
Standards Employed by Customs for Uniform Rights Enforcement 
(SECURE) as the basis for further expanded partnership among its 
members.'5 However, this process almost immediately ignited seri-
ous concerns and doubts from several developing countries who 
questioned the neutrality of the WCO Secretariat and the lack of 
prior consultation before the draft was put out "on a very politically 
sensi tive issue."76 They pointed out the lack of Terms of Reference 
within the SECURE Working Group before that Group proposed 
the text of SECURE for consideration, and insisted that the word 
"consensus" should not be used.77 On substantive issues, they ar-
gued that some of the proposed measures exceeded not only the 
authority of WCO but the scope of the TRTPS Agreement.78 For 
example, TRTPS does not require customs authorities to seize 
goods that may contain components which breach a patent.19 An· 
other example is the requirement of border measures on not only 
imports but also exports and transit.60 Moreover, they believed SE-
74. Through these two units, WCO built up an intellectual property enforcement 
mechanism within its Customs Enforcement Network. However, among the 173 ex· 
isting Members or Customs Territories, less than 50 have utilized the system for its 
intended purpose. See Larry L.. Burton, IPR and the Cuswms £.nforce.meJU Network 
(CEN), hUp:l/www.oecd.org/da~J~oecxl/42129135650471.pdf 
75. Also known as Provisional Global C\Jstoms Standards 10 Counter Intellectual 
Property Rights Infringements. as part of lhe Reporl of lhe SECURE Working Croup, 
SP0269El. June 2007, available ar hup~/www.wooomd.org/filesfl.%20Public%20filesl 
PDFandDocuments/Enforcement/SECURE_E.pdf. 
76. These countries are: Argentina, Brazil, China, C\Jba, Ec.Jador. and Uruguay. 
They jointly submitted a crilique "Document on the 'Reporl of the SECURE Working 
Group'" (SP0269EI}, availJJblt at hllp://www.ip-walch.org/files/Document%20on%20 
SECUREwg%20Reporl.pdf. 
77. /d. 
78. David Cronin, Clash Over IVorld Customs Organitalion Efforts on IP Enforc<-
niQU, b.rrru-•·~CTtJAI. PRoPF.}rrv WA1'Cl l, April 25, 2008, available at http://www.iP"' 
watch.orglweblogl 2008104125/clash-ovcr·world-.customso()fganization-cfrorts .. on·ip--en-
forcement/; see also Kaitlin Mara, Member Nations Balk at World 01stoms Of8ani~o· 
tio" IP Enforcement Push, lNru.JXC'Il..lAI ... P~tOP11R1·v WATC'H, June 27, 2008. a•,:ai/able 
ar hup~/www.ip-watcb.org/weblogf2008106127/member-nations- balk-at-world-customs-
organization· i p--enJoroemen t -push/. 
79. See supra note l5. The provision speci(ically identified the subject matter or 
border measures to be the importation of counterfeit trademartc or pirated copyright 
goods. Thus. for components that may infringe a patent. it is apparently outside or the 
realm of lhose n1easures. 
80. See supra no1e 75, Section I (10). 
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CURE breached the flexibility for international negotiations under 
the WIPO Development Agenda and dubbed it an attempt to cre-
ate a "TRIPS-plus-plus" regime.8'82 
As a resul t of heavy pressure from the developing economies, 
the WCO fi nally gave in and disbanded the controversial SECURE 
Working Group during its June 2009 Annual Council Sessions.83 
Taking its place is a newly established Counterfeiting and Piracy 
Group (CAP), which would limit its role to dialogue and exchanges 
of national experiences and would have no policymaking author-
ity.84 In line with the TRIPS Agreement, it would also restrict its 
definition of counterfeiting to trademark violations and of piracy to 
copyright violations, thereby removing concerns that its jurisdiction 
81. The ''Development Agenda .. was initiated by Argentina and Braz:il at the 
WJPO General Assembly in 2004, requiring future reform of international intellectual 
property system should take into consideration chc relevant concerns and issues of de-
veloping economies. See WI PO Secretariat, Proposal by Argentina and Brazil for the 
Establishment of A Development Agenda for WI PO. WO/GAI.ll/11 (31st ( l ~th Ex-
lraordinary) Session, August !7, 2004), available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/ 
govbody/enlwo_ga_311wo_ga_31_lt.pdr. In October 2007, the WI PO General Assem-
bly formally adopted a set of 45 recommendations (out of Il l being proposed) to en-
hance the development dimension of the Organization's activities and divided them 
into 6 clusters: (A) technical assistance and capacity building; (B) norm·setting, nex-
ibilities, public policy and public domain; (C) technology transfer. information and com4 
munication technologies (ICT) and access to knowledge; (D) assessment, evaluation 
and impact studies; (E) institutional matters including mandate and governance; and 
(F) Other issues. See \VlPO Secretariat. Report of rlre Provisional CommiJtee on Pro· 
posals Relau:d I() A WI PO Deve/opmem Agenda (PCDA), A/43/13 Rev. (43rd Series or 
Meetings, September 17, 2007). available at http:l/www.wipo.int/cxportlsitcsl www/ip-
developmentlen/agenda/rc<:ommendations.pdf; for its formal adoption, see WJPO. Gen 4 
era/ Report of tht Assemblies of the Member States of IV/PO, N43116 (43rd Series of 
Meetings, November 12, 2007), • 334 (at 1~1), available at http://www.wipo.int/edocsl 
mdocs/govbody/enla_43/a_ 43_16-main l.pdf. 
82. "TRIPS-plus" specifically refers to the TRIPS Agreement plus the two sG-Called 
WI PO Internet Treaties, i.e., WI PO Copyright Treaty (WCr) and WI PO Performances 
and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT), but may be generally referred to a state's commit· 
ments that go beyond thooe already included or consolidated in the TRIPS Agreement. 
&3. 'lllooe Members rorged a so..:alled "South·South Coalition," then disputed and 
boycotted the proposed Terms of Reference for the SECURE Working Group. making 
the works of this group impoosible to continue. See Xuan Li. IVCO SECURE: U.wns 
Learm from tht Aborlion of lhe TRIPS-Plus-Plus IP Enforcemem lniliative. South 
Center Research Paper No. 19, availabl~ at http:/lwww.southcentre.org/ index.php?op· 
tion=com_docman&task=doc_ download&gid: l23l&lang=en. 
84. WCO Policy Commission, Combating of Counterfeiting and Piracy (Item VIII 
011 the Agenda), SP0299E1 a. June II. 2009. available at htlp~/www.iP'watch.org/weblogl 
wp-content/uploads/20091061 item-viii-policy..:omm-sp0299c I a-l.pdf. 
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may cover patents and other forms of intellectual property 
infringement.85 
E. The Group of Eight (G8) Summit 
J n addition to the work undertaken by various international 
and inter·governmental organizations, the issue of combating coun-
terfeiting and piracy was brought on the agenda at the 2005 G8 
Summit Meeting for the first time.86 The Joint Declaration of the 
33rd G8 Summit at Heiligendamm, Germany in 2007, leaders of the 
13 leaders acknowledged the necessity of protecting intellectual 
property rights: 
We encourage a positive exchange of views on inter-
national experiences related to the crucial role and eco-
nomic value of intellectual property rights (IPR) 
protection and implementation of agreed international 
JPR protection standards. In this exchange we also need 
to consider the protection of IPRs in conjunction with the 
common good of human kind for the purposes of protect-
ing the environment and supporting public health. We af. 
firm our commitment for further cooperation in capacity 
building, human resource development and public aware-
ness programmes in the field of intellectual property.87 
85. William New, WCO Kills •sECURE" Group, 8111 Creates Health En[orctmtnt 
Mandate, INnu.J ... nlJAL PRot•ERTY \VA1·n1, July 9, 2009, available at hup://www.ip-
watch.org/weblog/2009107109/woo-kills-% E2%80%9Csecure% E2%80%90-group-bul-
creates~health-enforcement·ntandate/. Note that 110t all the developing economies! 
states are completely opposed to the content of SECURE. Moot, if not all, of them 
were appalled by the more autocrarlc style of former Director-General Michel Oanet 
(1998-2008) and the non-transparent process by which only representatives from devel-
oped countries were appointed to the working group in drarting the proposal. For a 
detailed description and analysis from the ''South..SOuth Coalition" perspective, see 
Xuan Li, .supra note 83. 
86. G8 Gleneagles Summit, Retlucing IPR flnttllet:lllal Property Rights/ Piracy anti 
Cowuerfeiling Tl~rough More Effectillf! Enforcement (July 8, 2005), available at http:// 
www.g8.utoronLo.ca/summitl2005gleneagleslipr_piraey.pdf. 
f!;T. }()int Statement by the German G8 Presitlency and tht Heads ()[State nndlor 
Govrmment of Bratil, China, India, Mexico and Sowh Africa on the occasion of tb~ G8 
Summit i" Heiligtmdamm, Germany (June 8, 2007}, availnble at http:IJwww.g.S.deJCon· 
tent/ EN/ArtikeV_g8.,;ummitlanlagen!o5-erklacrung-en,templateld:raw,property:pub 
licationfile.pdUoS..erklaerung-cn. Since 2005, leaders of Brazil. Olina, India, Mextco 
and South Africa have been invited to participate and join the issuance of the final 
declaration. Therefore, the forum has sin<:e been referred to as "08+5.'' 
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Note that right before the summit meeting, the GS Justice and 
Interior Ministers Meeting was held in Munich, Germany. In its 
Concluding Declaration, a specific section entitled Enforcing Intel· 
lectual Property Rights was created. Here, the ministers declared 
that "[c]omplex global criminal networks are becoming increasingly 
involved with lP crime. For these reasons, the fight against product 
piracy and counterfeiting is a crucial e lement of criminal law, regu· 
latory and economic policy as well as consumer protection."ss As a 
result, in terms of civil remedies, "[s]tates should consider establish· 
ing legal regimes where right holders are able to pursue the civil 
enforcement of their rights through expedited proceedings. Such 
proceedings may be designed to ensure that right holders can obtain 
court decisions solely on the basis of substantiated submissions and 
without hearing the opposing party, or at a hearing with an abbrevi· 
ated notice period. As a rule, such court decisions should be enforce-
able on the day of their issuance. At the same time, opposing 
parties must be protected against the misuse of such expedited pro· 
ceedings." [Emphasis added)89 In other words, the ministers were 
advocating that nations around the world adopt ex parte proceed· 
ings whereby stakeholders of intellectual property rights can secure 
completely enforceable default judgment against alleged 
infringer(s ). 
In terms of criminal investigation and prosecution, the Con-
cluding Declaration indicated that "there must be effective methods 
for law enforcement agencies to share information and to develop 
cooperative investigations across borders in order to combat piracy 
and counterfeiting offences. In this respect our experts have pro· 
duced 'Principles and Recommendations for Cooperative Jnvestiga· 
tion and Prosecution of Serious and Organized Intellectual 
Property Rights Crimes' and have identified national points of con· 
tact in our countries to facilitate international cooperation in these 
cases. We endorse this work and agree to continue and increase the 
targeting of international intellectual property crime. "90 What is 
unique about this GS summit was the beginning of a systematic out· 
reach, exchange and dialogue with GS members in the hope that 
88. 08 Justice and Interior Ministers Meeting, Concludu•g Declaration (May 23-25. 
2007), available a1 hUp://www.g-8.de/Content/ENIArtikeV20071051Anlageni2007..0.1-2S-
g8-justiz·innenminstertreffen~oncluding-declaration-en,property=publicationFile.pdf. 
S9. !d. 
90. !d. The "'expen group .. mentioned here referred to lhe 08 Lyon-Roma/Anti-
Crime and Terrorism Group and the principles referred to the work product of this 
group in November 2006. 
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concrete results would be achieved within two years. Hence the 
formation of the so-called "Heiligendamm Dialogue Process 
(HDP)'>9' 
Building on this bas.is and momentum, the issue of combating 
counterfeit and pirated goods once again turned up on the agenda 
of the 34th GS Summit at Toyako, Hokkaido in 2008. Contrary to 
previous declarations that only laid out general ideas or principles, 
the Leaders' Declaration this time provided a specific blueprint on 
what should be done and when it should be accomplished: develop-
ment of SECURE at the WCO, accelerating and concluding the 
negotiations of ACTA within a year and enhancing the WIPO Sub-
stantive Patent Law Treaty (SPLT) discussions on patent harmoni-
zation, as well as promoting information exchange systems among 
different authorities.92 
While the Heiligendamm Process bas apparently impacted IN-
TERPOL and WCO, and the conclusion of ACTA negotiations, it 
has also met strong resistance from developing economies, as de-
scribed above, thus the result so far can best be described as 
mixed.93 
91. G8 Summit, Heiligendamm Process, awsilable at http1/wv.-w.g·8.de/nn_92452/ 
ContentiEN/Artikell _g8-summitl2007.()6.()8..heiligendamm·prozess_en.html. Since 
GS Summit itself does not have a permanent secretariat, its members organized a steer· 
ing oom1nittee and request OECD to take charge of the administorative affairs concern· 
ing this process. 
92. G8 Hokkaido Toyako Summit, uaders Declaration (July 8, 2008), ,, 17, 18, 
available at http1/www.g8summit.go.jpleng!doc/doc080714_en.html. For the current 
status and analysis on ACTA, see infra; as for SPLT. see WI PO, Repon of the 15th 
Session of the Sranding Commitree on the l.aov of Parents, SCP/15/6 (October 11·15, 
2010). available at http://www.wipo.int/edocslmdocsls<:plen/sep_l5/scp_l5_6.pdf. Dis· 
cussions on the draft SPLT started at the 5th session of the Standing Committee on the 
Law of l'atents (SCP) in May 2001. While discussions led to some agreement in princi· 
pie on a number of issues, other topics have generated more difficulties i11 tenns or 
reaching agreement. As a result. the SPLT negotiations were put on hold in 2006. The 
work of the SCP was resumed in June 2008 by convening the 12th session of the SCP. 
The main focus since that session has been on building a technical and legal resource 
base from which to hold informed discussions in order to develop a work program. 
Therefore, a series or documents elaborating various aspeclS of patent law were pro--
duced and discussed at the subsequent sessions of the SCP. 
93. Concluding Report of the Hciligendamm Process, 11 23-25 (2009). as Annex 1 
to the L•Aquila GS Summit Joint Dec/IJration: Promoting tire Global Agenda, available 
at http1/www.g8italia2009.it/static/G8..Allegatoi06..Annex_I_HDP _Concluding.pdf. 
For details, see Repon of DiscttSsions of the G8 lnudlwual Property Experts Group 
Meeti11g, ••ailable at http://www.g8italia2009.it/static/G8..AIIegato/IT A L Y%2008%20 
1 PEG%20Finai%20Report%2cO.pdr. 11 is in this report that the pursuance of ACT A is 
rormally discussed and endorsed by the participating members. For rurther comments, 
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F. Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) 
On October 1, 2011, representatives from eight nations signed 
the final instrument of the ACT' A in Tokyo, Japan.94 This marked 
the end of almost four years of negotiation and the beginning of a 
first-of-its-kind, subject-matter specific multilateral trade (or more 
accurately, enforcement harmonization) agreement that may have a 
profound global impact on the substantive legislative and enforce-
ment protection of intellectual property rights as well as regional 
and bilateral free trade agreements.95 
1. The Negotiations 
As indicated supra, it was at the G8 Gleneagles Summit in 2005 
that Japan first initiated the creation of a new international frame· 
work against counterfeit and pirated products "in the context of the 
heightened awareness of the need for a higher degree of intellectual 
see Katharina Onath. Tile G8 and the Heillgendamm Process: A Group's Architecwre in 
Flux, contained in C. Herrmann and J.P. Terhechte (eds.). EUROPEAN YHARnooK OF 
I NTP.RNATIONAI, EcONOMIC LAW (2010). at 405-415, available at http://www.springer· 
professional.delspmblob/2194310/bodyRef/018--the-g8-and-the-heiligendamm-pro-
cess253a-a-groups-architecture-in-nux.pdf. 
94. The signatories arc: United States, Australia, Canada, Korea. Japan, New Zea 4 
land, Morocco, and Singapore. EU, Mexico and Switzerland also participated in the 
negotiations but did not sign the final inslrument, au citing reason ror not being able to 
conclude their respective domestic proceedings before the signing ceremony. In reality, 
however. the Mexican Parliament has already indicated to its President thai it would 
not ratify the treaty. and the EU Commission needed to conduct further studies on 
whether major legislative actions are required to ex.isting EU laws to comply with 
ACr A, e.g .• the added obligations to lnternet sen•ioe providers and criminal liabilities 
on circumvention of technical measures. among other things.. In addition, the EU 
Council of MinisLCrs still needs to authorize a representative to sign on the document 
and the EU Parliament would also need to ratify it. All three parties have until May I, 
2013 to sign the Agreement. See David Meyer, EU to Stay Away from ACTA Signing 
Ceremony, ZD Notr Bwo. September 29. 2011. available at http://www.zdnet.eo.uk/ 
blogs/com munica tion -brca k down -1 ()()()()()J()!eu-to-stay -away-r rom -acta-signing -cere-
mony-10024455/; European Commission, Commlsslon Sen•ices Working Paper: Com-
ments on the "Oplnion of European Academics on Anti-Counrtrfeiting Trade 
Agreement," April27. 2011. available at httpJ/trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/does/2011/apriV 
tradoe_t47853.pdf. 
95. ACf A will enter into force 30 days following the ratification and deposit of the 
sixth instrument among its signatories. See ACf A, Article 40.1. available al hllp:l/www. 
mora.go.jplpolicy/economy/i_property/pdfslactatt05_en.pdf. Because several major 
ongoing trade initiatives involve the same parties of ACT A, such as the Trans--Pacific 
Partnership (1.PP) initiated by the United States, the text and spirit of this agreement is 
likely to impact on the other negotiations. 
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property protection. "96 On October 23, 2007, the Office of the U.S. 
Trade Representative (USTR) and the Japanese Ministry of For-
eign Affairs (MOFA) jointly announced the initiative and invited 
the European Union to join in.97 The first round of negotiations 
began on June 3, 2008 in Geneva, Switzerland and the final (11th 
round was concluded on October I, 2010 in Tokyo, Japan.98 While 
13 parties initially participated in the first round of negotiations, 
two of them quit since the second round and never re-joined.99 
2. The Controversies 
What should have been just another routine negotiation turned 
out to be quite controversial from the beginning. Against the back-
drop of the stalemate at the Doha Round negotiations at the WTO, 
the breakdown of SPL T talks and the passage of the "Development 
Agenda" at the WIPO, the negotiating parties decided to simply 
take the form of a plurilateral coalition (contrary to the traditional, 
multilateral approach as in the WTO negotiations) and start afresh, 
largely out of growing disappointment and disillusion with both or-
ganizations as the norm-setting venues.'00 This frustration is fur-
96. Office of the USTR, Joim Press Statement of the Anti·Counlerfeiting Trade 
Agreement Nesotiating Parties. October 1. 2011, available at http://www.ustr.gov/about• 
uslpress-offioelpress-releases/20 J 1/ october/joint -press--stat em en l-an ti -cou n te rfci ti ng· 
trade-a g. 
97. USTR Press Release. Ambassador Schwab Announces U.S. will Suk New 
Trade Agrrement to Fight Fakes, October 23, 2007, •••ailable ar http://www.ustr.gov/ 
Documeni_Library/Press_Releases/20071 October/Ambassador_Sehwab_Announoes_ 
US_ Wiii..,Seek_New_ Trade_Agreemenl_to_Figlli_Fakes.html?hl;; European Commis-
sion Press Release, European Commission Seeks Mandate to Negotinte Major Ne.v In· 
lernatWnal Anti·Counterfelting Pac1, IPJ('J1fl573, October 23, 2007, available at http:// 
europa.culrapidlpressRclcasesAction.do?rcference=IP/0711573&format;HTML&agcd 
=O&Ianguage;EN&guiLanguag.,.o; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan Announcc-
mellt. Framework of the Anfi.Cowuerfeiting Trade Agreeme111 (ACTA), October 23 
2007. a•ailable at http:/lwww.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2007/I0/1175848_836.html. 
98. U.S. Trade Representative, Anti-counterfeiting Trade Agreement. awUiabk at 
http://www.ustr.gov/acta. 
99. I.e. Jordan and United Arab Emirates. 
LOO. Eddan Katz and Gwen Hinze, The Impact of the Anli·Coumerfeiting Trade 
Agreemem on tire Knowledge Economy: 11u:. AccowuabiHty of the Offra of the U.S. 
Trade Representative for the CreotWn of IP Enforcement Norms Through Execmive 
Trade Agreements, 35 YAIP J ....... ·c L. ONLINE 24 (2009), available at hUp;//www. 
yjil.org/does/pub/o-35-katz.hinze-ACf A-<>n-knowledge-econo.ny.pdf (noJe that the CO· 
authors are directors of international Arfairs and Policy. respectively. for Electronic 
Frontier Foundation, in generaJ criticaJ of both the processes and contents of the 
ACfA). Su also Susan K. Sell. 77te Globa/IP UpM'ard Ratchtt, Anri-Counterfeiting 
and Piracy Enforcement Efforts: Tile StiJie of Play (June 9, 2008), available at hup:/1 
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ther evidenced by the eventual establishment of an ACf A 
Committee to administer and manage the issues concerning the 
agreement.10' The decision by the U.S. government to classify all 
information concerning the negotiation process under the rubric of 
"national security" because it contained confidential "foreign gov-
ernment information" even before negotiations began raised many 
eyebrows both inside and outside the negotiations.' 02 The USTR's 
subsequent decision to treat ACf A solely as an executive agree-
ment rather than a treaty, therefore bypassing U.S. Senate ratifica-
tion and congressional oversight further heightened suspicion 
among many critics.'03 
Despite several attempts by public interest groups and a law-
suit, the USTR still refused to release any substantive information 
concerning the ACf A negotiations. 104 A resolution by the Euro-
www.twnsidc.org.sgltitle2Jintellectual_propeny/developmentresearchJSusanSell final 
version. pdf; Tim Davis. ACTA- Anti·Counrerfeiting Tradt! Agrument (2010), available 
at hnp://www.timdavis.eom.au/PapersJACfA._A_Review_from_Australia.pdf. 
101. ACT A. art. 36. The Final Text (May 201 I) of this Agreement is deposited at the 
Ministry of Foreign in Japan. available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/ 
i_property/pdfslacta ll05_en.pdf. 
102. Exec. Order No. 12,958. 60 Fen. R"o. 76 (April 17, 1995). amended by Exec. 
Order No. 13,292, 68 FEo. Rom. 60 (March 25, 2008). The USTR did so by first ha,.ing 
all parties signed a non·disdosure agreement before the negotiations were to begin. See 
Katz and Hime, supra note 100. at 31. See also Eric Pfanner, Quietly, Nations Grapple 
with Steps 10 Quash Fake Goods, N.Y. T imes. February 16,2010. a t 86; Nate Anderson, 
Anti·Ccumerftiting Trade Agrum.ent SlollChes toward Signing on Saturday, ART'S 
Tc<..11NJCA- TECIJ Po1.1C'Y AND LAw IN 1111 01GI1'AI~ Ac:P..., September 27,20 11, availo-
bk at http://arstechnica.com/tech·policy/news/201 1/09/anti-counterfeiting·trade·agree-
ment-slouchcs-.toward-signing·this·saturday.ars: Monika Ermert, ACTA: Negotiations 
Advance "Behind the Curtain",· Many Com:frns, Intellectual Property Watch, 2 August 
2008, http://www.ip.watch.org/weblog/index.php?p= I 186. 
103. This is because the USTR claims that none of the existing domestic laws need to 
be amended. In the case or Uruguay Round multilateral trade negotiations (1986-1993) 
under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATI) that led to the establish-
ment of WfO,the USTR was under the so-<alled "Fast Track" authority (later changed 
to .. Trade Promotion Authority (TPA)") by Congress to engage in negotiations with 
other trade partners. Sometimes referred to as a ;•congressional-executive agreement," 
the entire process was still under the ovcrsi&)lt of the House Ways and Means Commit· 
tee and Senate Finance Commiuee. and the final instruments along with the imple-
menting legislaLive bill would have to be approved by Congress in its entirety with a 
simple majority \'Ote. S•• 19 U.S.C. §§ 2191-2194 (2010); for detailed analysis, see Ka tz 
and Hinze. supra note 100, at 29-30. 
1()4. The lawsuit yielded only 159 pages of information, while 1 .. 162 pages were with· 
held for national security reasons. Su Electronic Frontier Foundation v. Office of the 
U.S. Trade Representative, Civil Action No 08·1599 (RMC)(D.C. Cir., 2008). The gov-
ernment's stance did not sway even after the change of administration in 2009. Ironi-
cally. a memorandum on the Freedom of lnfonnation Act calling for more openness 
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pean Parliament, a series of document leaks, including the availabil-
ity of a full "consolidated" draft in March 2010, and a public 
petition signed by 6,645 individuals coincided with the Eighth 
Round of negotiations in Welliogton, New Zealand (thus also 
known as the "Wellington Declaration"'05) and eventually 
prompted the USTR, the EU and many other parties to fundamen-
tally change their attitude and position.106 The WikiLeaks disclo-
sures rendered the secrecy issue moot and further exposed the 
serious squabbling and confusion among the negotiators.'07 
a. Scope and definition 
The ACT A aims to protect all types of intellectual property 
rights, with focus primarily on enforcement measures against coun-
terfeit trademark and pirated copyright goods. A Contracting Party 
may take the option to exclude the protection of patents and undis-
closed information (trade secrets) from civil enforcement and bor-
der measures under the Agreement, however.'08 A.s a result, it can 
be argued that the strength of the ACT A may be significantly di-
luted if any Contracting Party chooses to opt out of the obligations 
in these two areas. In terms of criminal enforcement or enforce-
ment in the digital environment, enforcement practices and interoa-
and transpllrcncy was signed by President Barack Obama right after he took orfice. Su 
Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Department and Age.ndes on Freedom of In· 
formation, January 21.2009,74 F~oo. Rm. 4683-84 (January26, 2009}, avaifabk at http;/ 
/www.gpo.gov/fdsyslpkg!FR-2009.{)1·26/pdf!E9·1773.pdflpage..l. After counsels ror 
the government illformcd the court of the Executive Branch's position and realized how 
little discrelion the court may have to overrule that decision, EFF and olher co-plain· 
tiffs dropped the case on June 17,2009. 
105. Stephen Bell, PublicACTA Hammen 0111 "Wellington D.clnration": Critics of 
lmeUectual ProJ)<rty Call for lnd<JJ<ntknt National Impact Analysis, April 12, 2010, 
CoMPt.n·••RWORJ-D, available at http://computerworld.eo.nz/ncws..nsflnewsfpublicacta-
hammers-out-wellington-declaration. 
106. European Parliament, Rt"Solution of 10 March 2010 on the Transparency and 
State of Play of tiU! ACTA NegotiatiorJS (March 10, 2010), ao•ailabk at http://www. 
europarl.europa.eu/sideslgetDoe.do?pubRef= .ffEP/ITEXT + T A+P1·TA-201 0.0058+0+ 
DOC+XML+VOIIEN. The series of earlier leaks offered only bits and pieces or the 
discussions, whereas Lhe March 2010 leak, apparently done by someooe(s) from inside, 
offered by then the most significant and major revelation of all the detailst including the 
full text or the draft agreement. 
107. E.g .• IVik/Leaks Cables Shirre L.ight on ACTA History, LA OuADRATURI' J>U 
No' r, February 3, 2011, available at hup://www.laquadraturc.nelfen/wikileaks-cables· 
shjne,..light·on~acta-history. 
108. ACI'A, art. 2, note 2; art. 13. note 6. 
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tiona! cooperation, the ACf A excludes neither patents nor trade 
secrets.'09 
Counterfeit trademark goods is defined as "any goods, includ-
ing packaging, bearing without authorization a trademark which is 
identical to the trademark validly registered in respect of such 
goods, or which cannot be distinguished in its essential aspects from 
such a trademark, and which thereby infringes the rights of the 
owner of the trademark in question under the law of the country 
.. .'" 
10 Pirated copyright goods is defined as "any goods which are 
copies made without the consent of the right holder or person duly 
authorized by the right bolder in the country of production and 
which are made directly or indirectly from an article where the 
making of that copy would have constituted an infringement of a 
copyright or a related right under the law of the country ... ""' 
They are essentially the same as the definitions provided in the 
TRIPS Agreement. 112 
Critics point out that the definition of a "right holder" explic-
itly "includes a federation or an association having the legal stand-
ing to assert rights in intellectual property," but conspicuously 
omits the author or inventor.113 Given that few substantive steps 
have been taken to inform, engage, or even consider public interest, 
the ACf A seems to put corporate interests before those of individ-
ual content creators and neglect the essential need to balance the 
two.114 
b. Enforcement in the Digital Environment 
Perhaps the most controversial aspect of the entire Agreement, 
Section 5 extends both the civil (Section 2) and criminal (Section 4) 
enforcement to the Internet (hence this section is sometimes re-
109. The U.S. patent system docs not have criminal liability or criminal enforcement 
measures against patent infringers. other than punitive treble damages in case of willful 
infringement See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (20 I 0). In 1he lrade secret area, criminal liability may 
be imposed at the federal level (Le .• the Federal Economic Espionage Act of 1996. Pub. 
L. No. 104-294, 110 Stat 3488 (1996), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-32 (2010)) or if the accused 
satisfied the legal requirement of stealing or theft under a state's criminal suuutes . . 
110. ACf A. arl. 5 (d). While the text is a bit different from the U.S. Trademark 
(Lanham) Act slandard ( .. identical with, or substantially indistinguishable from"), lhey 
should be functionally equivalent. See 18 U.S.C. § 2320(e)(I)(A)(ii)(2010). 
Ill. ACfA, arc 5 (k). 
112. See supra note 15. 
113. ACfA, an. 5 (1). 
114. David M. Quinn, A Crilica/ Look at the Ami·Coumerftiling Trade AgreemetU, 
17 Rl<'llMONO J. L TEm. 16 (2011). 
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ferred to as the "Internet Chapter") and covers both commercial 
and non-commercial activities, Le., individual peer-to-peer file shar-
ing.115 All Contracting Parties are permitted to take all effective 
actions (civil, criminal and/or administrative) against infringing ac-
tivities in the digital environment to create a deterrent while avoid-
ing the creation of barriers to legitimate activity and preserving the 
fundamental principles.''6 The ACT A apparently refrains from us-
ing terms such as fair use or other affirmative defenses, yet Article 
27 is by far the only area that the entire Agreement touches on the 
subject. 
On the ISP liability, Contracting Parties must allow the en-
forcement authority to order the "expeditious disclosure" to the 
right holder(s) the identity of the suspected subscriber engaged in 
infringing activities, as long as a legal infringement claim is filed and 
the information is only used for the enforcement of the intellectual 
property rights. 117 
Note that the far more controversial "graduated response" or 
"three strikes" rule that would have imposed an affirmative duty 
for the ISPs to actively eradicate online infringing materials, includ-
ing, among other things, cutting off access and accounts of the sus-
pected subscriber(s), was dropped at the end of the negotiations. 
So is the "safe harbor" on the so-called "notice-and-take-down" 
rules for ISPs because the negotiating parties cannot agree on the 
exact, technical steps that an ISP should take to immunize them 
from liability. 118 
115. ACfA, art. 27.2: " . .. each Party's enforcement procedures shall apply to in· 
fringemenl or copyright or related rights over digital networks. which may include the 
unlawful use of means of widespread distribution for infringing pu.rposts." fEm.phasis 
added) 
116. ACfA, art. 27.2. In light of diflcrenttrcatment on ordrt public (public policy) 
issues. questions remain as to whether a oourt in one state will provide full faith and 
credit to the judgment of another. f'or example. the U.S. aHov.> the selling of Nazi 
memorabilia online but that is prohibited in EU. Thus., whether a dcrivath•c work bear· 
ing Nazi symbols can receive copyright protection or. conversely. whether a ban on 
lhese saJcs by the EU court can be honored and enforced in the U.S. remained to be 
clarified. 
11 7. ACI'A, art. 27.4. Cf., article II. 
118. Different versions/options or tltese rules were on the various earlier drafts dur· 
ing the negotiations process. E.g., Draft ACfA, art 2.18 (Public Predecisional/Deliber· 
alive Draft. April 2010). avoi/able or http://www.ustr.gov/webfm.Jiend/1883. Note that 
t.he proposed .. graduated response" rules received vehement opposition before the Eu· 
ropean Parliament. As a compromise, the European Parliament in the end adopted a 
report entitled CuffUral ltJdustries ;, £uroJH instead on April 10, 2008, and urged all 
par&ies involved to "strike the balance between the impact of illegal file sharing on 
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On the protection of technological measures or anti-circum-
vention, the ACfA adopts the same approach found in the U.S. 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 (DMCA) 119 and requires 
all Contracting Parties protect against (1) the act of circumvention 
itself, (2) the marketing of a device or product or a service as a 
means of circumventing an effective technological measure, i.e., 
providing means for access, or (3) the manufacturing, importation 
or distribution of a device or product or a service primarily for the 
purpose of circumventing or has only a limited commercially signifi-
cant purpose other than circumventing an effective technological 
measure, i.e., providing means for copying. In other words, like 
DMCA, the statute distinguishes between access control (anti-traf-
ficking) and copy technologies. 120 But unlikely DMCA that treats 
them differently, with direct prohibition on the act of circumvention 
being imposed with respect to access control technologies only, the 
ACf A does not make such distinctions but only calls for effective 
protection of all three types of circumstances.' 2 ' 
On digital rights management (DRM) information, the ACfA 
requires all Contracting Parties to provide protection against the 
removal or alteration of any such information or the distribution, 
importation, broadcasting, communicating or making available to 
the public of the copyright works knowint, the DRM has been re-
moved or altered without authorization.' 2 Interestingly, here for 
the first time the ACf A requires that "any person ... having rea-
sonable grounds to know, that it will induce, enable, facilitate, or 
conceal an infringement of any copyright or related rights" may 
also be liable.'23 In other words, the ACf A is using the DRM issue 
to have all Contracting Parties formally adopt indirect (or secon-
dary) liability such as inducement, contributory and vicarious liabil-
creators and on the creative industries and the need to safeguard fundamentaJ rights, 
including privacy and freedom of expression ... Su European Parliament Report o" QtJ. 
rural Industries in Euro[J<, 2007n153 (INI), at 8. 14 (March 4. 2008), httpJ/www. 
europarl.europa.culocii/FiodByProcoum.do?laog=2&procnum=l Nll200712153. 
119. Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2800 {1998). This legislation marks the most 
sweeping refornl of the U.S. copyright reginle since the enactment of the Copyright Act 
of 1976. See l'ub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat 2541 (1976). 
120. 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (a)(2)(2010). 
121. ACTA, art. 27.5, 27.6. 
122. ACTA, art. 27.7. 
123. ld. 
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ity, an issue that has stirred up major controversies in Europe in the 
past.•2• 
c. The ACTA Committee 
Another noticeable development from this Agreement is the 
creation, completely separate from the WTO and WJl>O, of the 
ACTA Committee to review the implementation and operation, 
consider amendments, and oversee the accession of new signato-
ries.'2.' Among the several tasks the ACTA Committee may choose 
to do, one is to "seek the advice of non-governmental persons or 
groups.''126 This should assure the continuous influences from vari-
ous trade associations andlor rights groups which have already 
demonstrated their strong impact in shaping up the negotiations 
and current version of the ACT A. The successfulness or failure of 
this type of arrangement can also determine the future direction of 
international trade agreements, be they multilateral or regional and 
the respective roles of the WTO and WIPO. 
d. The Outcome 
Ironically, on July 4, 2012, the Independence or National Day 
of the United States, the European Parliament rejected ACT A. 121 
124. E.g., on 12 July 2005, in the wake of the U.S. Supreme Court decision on Mecro--
Go/dovyn·Mayer Swdios, Inc. v. Groksrer, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005), the European 
Commission issued a proposal ror the European Council and Parliament to adopt a 
Directi•·e on Crimilwl Measures Aimed Ill Ensuring tire Enforcement of Intellectual 
Properly Rig/us and a Council Framework Decision to Strengthen Ihe Criminal Law 
Framework to Combat JmellettUill Property Offenses, COM (2005) 276 ~nal (July 12, 
2005). anumded COM (2006) 168 final (April 24, 2006). avallnble nt hup-J/eur· 
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/sitelen/oom/2006/com2006_0168enOI.pdf. A focal point was 
whether there was the need to recognize indirect liability. Not surprisingly, this propo-
sal immediately generated significant controversies across both sides of the Atlantic 
Ocean, with discussions mostly centered on the vague language of the proposed statute, 
such as what exactly constitutes '"inciting'' and what amounts to .. a commercial scale," 
among other things. Al the hearing in the European Parliament on November 22. 2005. 
it became clear that a consensus may be very difftCUit to reach among the various orga-
nizations and associalions participated. See Marius Scltneider and Olivier Vrins. The 
EU Offe,sive ogauiStiP OffeiiC<S: Should Right-holden Be Offended7, I J. IP LAw & 
PRAM'Iffi 173 (2006). 
125. ACTA art. 36.2. 
126. ACTA art. 36.3 (b). 
127. The final tally was 478 against 39. with 165 abstentions. Under EU Treaty arti· 
cles 207 and 218, most international agreements need Parliament's consent to enter into 
force. Equally. aJI EU countries need 10 ratify them. European Parliamenl Rtjecls 
ACTA. EuROI:>f:!.AN PARUAMFN"r PrulSS Rru~A.SF, July 4, 2012. m:aUablt at http://www. 
europarl.europa.eu/pdfs/news/expert/infopress/201207031PR48247/201207031PR48247_ 
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This means that neither the EU as a whole nor its individual mem-
ber states can join the agreement. This no doubt, dealt a significant 
blow to the outcome of ACf A, renderin~ other nations much less 
incentivized to accede to the agreement.' 
G. Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 
A special chapter exclusively devoted to the protection of in-
tellectual property rights first appeared in the legal text of the 1993 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).'29 It was nego-
tiated during the time the TRIPS Agreement negotiations were 
deadlocked, almost a parallel to the background of ACf A negotia-
tions. Ever since then, similar arrangements have become routine 
in almost every FT A the U.S. Government is a party to, be it bilat-
e ral or regional. •:JO 
A unique regional development since November 1989 has been 
the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC).'3 ' Although it 
only serves primarily as a consultative forum for economic and 
trade dialogues and its current 21 member economies (deliberately 
en.pdf. For the text of the resolution. see European Parliament legislative resolution or 
4 July 2012 on the draft Council decision on the conclusion of the Anti-Counterfeiting 
Trade Agreemenl. availabk at hltp://www.europarl.europa.cu/sideslgetDoc.do?pul> 
Ref=-%2!%21EP%2f%2ffEXT%2l>TA %2l>P7-TA-2012.()287%2l>0%2t>DOC%2b 
XML%2bV0%2f%2rEN&IanguageaEN. 
128. William New and Monika Em1ert, EurOJHtln Parliamelll Rtjtcrion Pms ACTA 
fUJurt In Doubt, INTELLEcruAt. P•~orERTY WATCII, July 4. 2012, availllble at http:// 
www.ip-watch.org/2012107104/european-parliament-rejcction·puts·acta·future-in-
doubtl. 
129. NAFTA, ch. 17, available a1 hup:Jiwww.nafta-see-alena.or8fenlview.aspx?conJD 
=590. 
130. E.g., Dominican Republic-Central America-United States FTA (CAFTA-DR), 
ch. 15, available at htlp:Jiwww.ustr.gov/trade-ag_reemenlSifree-trade-agreements/cafta· 
dr-dominican-republic-central-america·ftalfina1-text; United States-Korea FT A 
(KORUS fT A. approved by Congress on October 12, 2011), ch. 5 and 18, available a1 
http:J/www.ustr.gov/trade-agreemen&·s/rree-trade-agrccmcntslkorus-(ta/final-text. 
KORUS FTA provides arguably the most extensive legal protection of intellectual 
property rights in any given treaty thus rar, despite the ract that Korea is already a party 
to the ACf A. The EU takes a more streamlined approach by having the signatories of 
a given agreement simply pledge their commitment in adequate and effective intellec-
tual property rights protection. See, ~.g., EU-Mediterranean Agreement Establishing 
an Association between the European Communities and Their Member States and Jor-
dan, Annex VII, f2002] O.J. L 12913. available al hup:lleur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServl 
LexUriServ.do?uri~OJ:L: 2002:129:0003:0165: EN: PDF. 
131. Hadi Soesastro, APEC's Overall Gools and Objectives, Evolution ond Current 
Sumt.S, contained as ch. 2 of RwuARO E. Ft-!JNJWRC:, tJ>., APEC AS AN lNs-rrnrrroN: 
Mtu:m..A·mRAL Govt'RNANCI:! IN Tim AsiA·PAcwrc (2003), at 31-44. 
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not referred to as states to cover the political reality) do not engage 
in formal negotiations or enter into legally binding agreements, its 
de facto institutional authority, albeit in the forms of "best prac-
tice," "guidelines," "initiatives," umodels," or ~'non-binding princi-
ples," are without question. It manages to carry out various tasks 
and meet its objectives through the adoption of Collective Action 
Plans (CAPs) or Individual Action Plans (IAPs).132 
In the area of intellectual property, APEC's trade ministers in 
June 2005 adopted an Anti-Counterfeiting and Piracy Initiative 
(ACPI), and subsequently proposed a series of region-wide IPR 
Model Guidelines to reduce the trade and sale of counterfeit and 
pirated goods, and to secure supply chains against those goods.133 
In addition, the 2007 fPR Guidelines on Capacity Building, Coop-
eration In itiative on Patent Acquisition Procedures, and a proposed 
Best Practices Paper on Innovative Techniques for IPR Border En-
forcement were developed to assist Member Economies in dealing 
with a wide range of issues concerning counterfeit and pi rated 
goods.134 In hindsight, they served as a prelude to the subsequent 
ACTA and TPP trade negotiations (to be discussed infra). Since all 
of these "guidelines" are not legally binding and most of them 
touch on procedural aspects or capacity building only, they have 
132. /d.; s.e also APEC. How A PEC Operates, available ar htlp://www.apcc.orgl 
About-Us/How- A PEC-Operates.aspx. 
133. Tiley are: Model Guidelines to Protect ag~~insl Unauthorized Copies, Model 
Guidelines to Reduce Trade in Counterfeit and Pirated Goods.. Model Guidelines to 
Prevent the Sale or Counterfeit and Pirated Goods over the I nternet, adopted in No-
vember 2005. In June 2006, two more were adopled: Model Guidelines for Effeclive 
P\Jbli<: Awareness Campaigns on lnlelleclual Property Righls, and Model Guidelines 10 
Secure Supply Chains against Counlerfeit and Piralcd Goods. See APEC Press Re-
lease, Trade Ministt.rs Endorse Anti~CounJerfeitilrg and Piracy lnitiutit~e, June 3, 2005, 
available at hup:l/www.apec.org/apeclncws_ mcdial2005_mcdill.ftleases1Q30605_ipr. 
html. :ke also APEC. Effeclive Pracric-. for Regulatwns related 10 Optical Disc Pro-
duction, 2003/AMM/025 (October 17-18. 2003), and Three Model Ouidelin<S APEC 
Ami-Counterfeiting atrd Piracy lnitiatil:e, 2005/AMMJ002anx4rev1 (November 15·16, 
2005), available at http://www.apcc.org/content/apeclapcc_groupslcommillec_on_tradel 
intellectuaJ_property. McdialibDownload.vl .html?urla/etcJmedialiblapec_mcdia_li-
braryldownloadslcommittees/ctilipeglmisc.Par.OOOl.File.vl.l. 
134. A PECISCCP, Best Practiu.s Paper on lmwvarive T.chniqua for /PR Border 
Enforcement, 2007/SOMJ/SCCP/016 (June 23-25, 2007), available ar hllp:l/aimp.apcc. 
org!Documents/2001/SCCP/ SCCP2107_secp2_016.doc; APEC Cfl, CoofH!ration Initio· 
tlve 011 Patent Acquisition Proctdures. htrp:l/aimp.apec.org!Documcnts/ 2007/SOMJ 
SOM3/07 _som3_020.doc (Seplernber 2, 2007). 
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generated far less controversies than what was happening at the 
WCO, WHO, WIPO and WT0. 135 
On the other hand, despite its potential influence, APEC in 
recent years seems to have lost steam for a wide variety of reasons, 
ranging from an inadequate management structure, an increasingly 
low funding level stretched thin by commitments, and most of all, 
the lack of political commitment by certain member economies in 
the absence of a legally binding mandate.• :~<> The very reasons for 
its earlier success and significant outreach may well be the same 
reasons for its current lack of progress and direction. The diversity 
among its members and mistrust between developed and develop-
ing economies certainly do not help.'37 As a result, many of the 
guidelines remained mere paperwork without substantive 
implementation.'38 
H. Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPPA) 
1. The Background 
With the future of ACT A in limbo, the negotiations of TPPA 
intensified. From a geopolitical perspective, when the idea of hav-
ing the U.S. and China forging a "02" role in dealing with global 
i.ssues fell on deaf ears of the leadership of both sides, 139 it became 
more apparent and necessary for the U.S. to strengthen ties with its 
trade partners in the Pacific region in order to carry out its "pivot to 
135. Traditionally the United States. Canada. and Japan have been able to exert tre-
mendous influence over the agenda and direction of APEC. 
136. See FmNn~Ro, supra note 131, at 3-5. A recent example is the missing of Presi-
dent Barack Obama of the United States at the 2012 APEC Leader>hip Meeting in 
Vladivostok, Russia. Ostensibly for reason of scheduling conflict with the Democratic 
National Convention, many believe the U.S. President is also playing tic-for-lac with 
the Russian President Vladimir Putin for declining Obama's invitation to attend the GS 
Sum mil only days before, held at Camp David, Maryland. Ironically, il was at rhe initia-
th•e of President William J. Clinton that APEC had its first leadership summit at Seat-
tle, Washington in t993. 
137. Ambassador Ronald D. Palmer, Globalism vs. Economic Nationalism: The 
Southeast Asian Case, AMERICAN Dn•LOMAN, June 1999, available at http:l/www.unc. 
eduldepts/diplomat/ A 0 _Issues/ amdipl_ 12/palmer..globall.html. 
138. Assafa Endeshaw, Do Asian Nations Take lme/Jecwal Property RightS Seri-
OIIsly?, 4 S<·Rti'T·uo., Issue 2, at 166-179 (2007). available at hnp:llwww.law.ed.ac.uk/ 
ah rc/script -ed/vot4-2/c ndeshaw .asp. 
139. Francois Godemcnt, Mathieu DuchAtel, and Thibaud Voila, No R11sh imo Mar-
riage: Cirino's Response to tlu! G2, EuROPEAN COUN<:Jl. ON FoREIGN Ru..A110K.'i 
CHINA ANAr.vsrs No. 22. June 2009, available at http:J/www.cenrreasia.eu/sitesldefaultl 
riles/publications_pdf/china_analysis_n22_no_rush_into_marriage_chinas_response_IO_ 
the_g;!_O.pdf. 
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Asia" policy strategy,' 40 as well as to leverage and compete against 
the possible forming of a Regional Comprehensive Economic Part-
nership (RCEP) involving the ten ASEAN members, Australia, 
China, India, Japan, South Korea and New Zealand (also known as 
the "A SEAN Plus Six"}.141 For example, during the third Presiden-
tial Debate at Lynn University, Boca Raton, Florida on October 22, 
2012, President Barack Obama stated: 
"(W)e believe China can be a partner, but we're also send-
ing a very clear signal that America is a Pacific power, that 
we are going to have a presence there. We are working 
with countries in the region to make sure, for example, 
that ships can pass through, that commerce continues. 
And we're organizing trade relations with countries other 
than China so that China starts feeling more pressure 
about meeting basic international standards."142 
The Chinese government publicly shrugged off this bashing 
statement, viewed it only as political rhetoric during the American 
presidential campaign and tried to focus on the positives of Sino-
American bilateral relations. 143 In private, however, there were 
140. President Barack Obama announced. in his speech before the Australian Partia· 
menton November 17, 2011, that ••as a Pacific nation, the United States will play a 
larger and long·term role in shaping Lhis region and its future, by upholding core princi· 
pies and in clooc partnership wilh our allies and rriends." T1ws lhe birth or the so-called 
U.S. pivot to Asia strategy by which 1he U.S. tries to re-balance its nacional security 
priorities and reassert its leadership role in the Asia·Pacific region. Offioo of the Press 
Secretary of the White House. R~marks By Pre.sidt!nt Obama to 1/u! Australian Purlia-
mem. November 17,2011, PRt•~o;;s Rl~t.EASE, available az http:Jiwww.whitehouse.gov/tbe· 
press..office/2011/11/1 7/remarks--president· obama-australian·parliament. 
t4t. Jeju Peace lnstitut~ Diplomats' Roundl.ablt ASEAN tmd £osl A.sla11 Coopera-
tiOtl, PRo<l~F-DINGS Ot' ·nm. 7Tu Jmu Fo1~UM n _)R PHA<'P & PnOS:Pl:•~rrv. availabk at 
hup://www.jejupeaceforum.or.kr/ skyboard/download.sky'lrid•2403&gid• 301&code-
sky_enr-annou. See 11/.so K. Shanmugam, Keyn01e Sp~edJ at the 20/3 annual Turkish 
Ambassador?s' Conference? 01 AtJkara, Turkey, StNGAPOR~ MtNI~~·Rv OF FoRhtON AF· 
a:AIRS Pru.:.SS RL.Lt~.Se, January 4, 2013, t 40, available at http://www.mfa.gov.sglcon 
tenttmro/ media_centrelpress_room/sp/2013/Janlspecch..20130104.html; Brookings In· 
stitution, Understa11dl11g the U.S. Pivol to Asia, at 51·53 (Remarks or Oaude Barfield. 
Residenl Scholar, American Enterprise Institute)., January 31,2013, transcript available 
ar http://www.brookings.edu/-/media/events/2012/t/ 31 %20us%20asia/20120131_pivot_ 
asia.pdr. 
142. Orfoce of the Press Secretary or the White House, Remarks by the Presidelll and 
Governor Romney in lhe Thin/ PresitWuiol Debm~. P1u._~s Ru..EASF, October 23, 2012, 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-officel2012110/23/remarks-president· 
and-governor-romney·third-presidential-debate. 
143. According to a statement by HONG Lei, the spokesperson or the Chinese Min-
istry of Foreign Affairs, .. the sustained, sound and stable development of China-US 
36 CoN"rEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES 
signs of growing concerns over the U.S. attempt to lay more pol iti-
cal, economic and military obstacles to the growing influence of 
China or even deploying what may be considered a de facto, out-
right economic blockade.144 Thus China suddenly became more in-
terested in pursuing the RCEP or "ASEAN Plus Six" initiative 
which would pave the way for the escalation of potential conflicts 
between two emerging trade blocs.••s 
2. The Process 
TPP started from a 2002 APEC "sideline meeting" among the 
leaders of Chile, New Zealand and Singapore, known as the "Pa-
cific Three Closer Economic Partnership" or P3-CEP at the time.'40 
When Brunei Darussalam joined the negotiations in April 2005, it 
was renamed the "Pacific Four" or "P4".' 47 Although not formaUy 
authorized or sanctioned by APEC, and unlike APEC that only 
serves as a non-binding forum among its members, it was an at-
tempt to create the first formalized and a model free trade arrange-
relations serves the fundamental interests of both countries and peoples, and is condu· 
cive to peace. stability and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific re.g.ion and the world al large. 
US politicians. no matter which party they represent, should view China's development 
in an objective and sensible light, and do more to promote China-US murual trust and 
cooperation in a responsible manner. This is also in the interest of the US." Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of the PRC Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hong Lei's Regular Pnss 
Conference, October 23, 2012. available at hnp1/www.fmprc.gov.cnlenglxwfw/s25 101 
2511/1982088.shtml. 
144. WANG Zhaokun. China an adversary: Obama, G1..0flAI. TIMI-zS, October 24, 
2012, available a1 hltp1/www.globaltimes.cn/contenll740060.shtml; Carlos Tejada and 
Josh Chin. Don't Get Mad: China Reacrion 10 Obama •Adversary• Commenl, WAu. 
STREET JOURNALlCm.NA R.tiAJ .. TIME Ru>oRT., October 24, 2012, available 01 http:// 
b logs. ws j .com/chi narealli me/20 12/1 0124/d on 1-get-mad-eh in a .. h rugs-<>ff -<>bam a- advcr-
sary-(;()mment/. 
145. Petcllancl Pratruangkrai, ASEAN+6 Set To Launch Wortd·s Biggest Free-Trade 
Marke.t, Thailand the Natjon, February 7. 2013. available at hu.p:J/www.nationmul-
timedia.com/business/ Asean+6--set-to-launch- worlds-biggest-rree-trade-ma-30 I 92768. 
html. 
146. It was during 1he lOth APEC Leadership (or Summit) Meeting at Los Cabos, 
Mexico and at the joint initiation or President Ricardo Lagos of Chile, Prime Minister 
Helen Clark of New Zealand and Prime Minisler GOH Chok Tong of Singapore. On 
June 3. 2005. the three nations concluded a Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partner-
ship Agreement, effective May 28 the next year. For full text, see New Zealand Minis-
try of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT), Trans. Pacific Strategic Economic Panne,;hip 
Agreement. available aJ http://W\\rw.m(at.govtnz/downloadsltrade·agreementllranspa-
cific/majn. agreement.pdf. 
147. New Zealand MFAT, UnderslaJUiing the P4- The Original P4 Agreement, avail· 
able at http:J/www.mfat.govtnz/Trade-and-Economic-Relations/2-Trade-Relationships· 
and-Agreementsffrans-Pacific/2-P4.php. 
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ment that bridges Asia, the Pacific and the Americas to promote 
resource sharing and cooperation, thereby enhancing the competi-
tiveness of all the regions involved - ideally a win-win strategy for 
al l.' 48 It strives for transparency and ultimately sets a vision towards 
the eventual establishment of a "Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pa-
cific" or FTAAP.149 For the latter, however, complex poli tical and 
economic factors simply re ndered it too difficult to yield any signifi-
can t progress and the process is more or less paralyzed to this 
dateJ$o 
On the other band, the "Free Trade Area of the Americas" or 
FT AA negotiations under the U.S. auspices also ran into a snag by 
2005, and there is no indication that the process is likely to be re-
vived in the foreseeable future.'$' Meanwhile, the respective trade 
148. /d. In accordance with the P4 Agreement. more than 90% of goods now cnjo)'li 
tariff.free treatment and a oomprehensive tariff reduction shaU be realized by 2017. In 
addition, any vendor of cbe participating Slates is quali[ied to part.icipace in bidding 
competition or any government procurement project at 8110ther participating state. 
149. fTAAP was first initiated by the Canadian business representatives at the sec-
ond meeting of the APcC Business Advisory Council (ABAC) in 2004. 11tis proposal 
was then submitted to the Trade Policy Forum of the Pacific Economic Cooperation 
Council (PcCC), a business consultancy to APEC for further discussions. By 2006, 
leaders of the APEC economies formally stated in their Ha Noi Declaration: .. We 
shared the APEC Business Advisory Council"s views that while there are practical diffi-
culties in negotiating a free Trade area or lbe Asia-Pacific at this time. it would nonethe-
less be timely for APEC to seriously consider more effective 3\'Cnues towards trade and 
investment liberalization in tbe Asia-l,acific region ... APEC Secretariat. 2006 L..t.aden' 
Declaration - Towards A Dynamic Community for Sustainable Developmvu and Pros-
~rity, November 18-19, 2006, availabl< at http://www.apec.org/Meeting·Papersl Lead· 
ers-Oeclarations12(X)612())6_aelm.aspx. For related comments. see C. Fred Bergsten, 
Towards A Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific, P1r n .:.R C PJ.rrtRSON INS11TUTE r-oR 
l l'l'n--:RNATIONAI~ Enmo.MIC'S.: Poucv BRIEI·'S IN IN1"UU,.A110NAl. E<'ONO.Mif'S No. 
PB07·2, February 2007, available at http~lwww.iie.oomlpublications/pblpb07·2.pdf. 
150. In fact, even some of the very individuals involved in the promotjoo of FrAAP 
foresaw the enormous obstacles lying ahead. See Roben Scollay, PrtlimiJrtlry Assess· 
ment of the FTAAP Proposal, presented at the PECC Trade Forum and ASCC Joint 
Meeting, May 22-24, 2005, available m http:J/www.apec.of8-au/docslkoreapapers21SX· 
RS-Siides.pdf. s .. also APEC Secretariat, Further Analytical Study on the Ukely Eco· 
ncmic lmpnct of An FTAAP. Paper submitted by Australia~ Otina, Korea, and New 
Zealand for Concluding Senior Officials' meeting. 2009/CSOM/R/010, Agenda Item: 
6.3, Octcber 2009, available at hup:J/aimp.apec.org/Documents/2009/SOM/CSOM·RI 
09_csort1J_OIO.pdf. Another unspeakable, and yet perhapo major oonccm among many 
APEC eoonomies is that the U.S. is perreived to have too dominant a role in tbe direc-
tion of APEC. thus a fresh round of negotiations towards an FTAAP may provide a 
leverage to balance Lhe U.S. inOuencc. 
151. FTAA was formally launched by the 34 heads of states at the first Summit of the 
Americas on December C).. t l , 1994 in Miami, Florida, on the heel of the successful con· 
elusion or NAFT'A. The U.S. government clearly wanted to take the leadership role and 
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negotiatio ns between China, tbe ASEAN member states, Korea 
and Japan seemed to be off to a relatively smoother start. 152 To 
leverage and counter-balance this development, the U.S. govern-
ment set its eyes on the TPP and seized the initiative.153 
Once the leadership role changes hands, in a process resonant 
to that of ACT A, negotiators and "stakeholders", i.e., businesses 
who have registered with the USTR in advance to be briefed on the 
progress of the TPPA are now sworn to secrecy, even some key 
members of U.S. Congress are "stonewaUed" by the USTR.154 Not 
expand the momentum built from NAFT A to the entire Western Hemisphere. See First 
Summit or the Americas. Dec/oration of Principles, December 9·11, 1994, 1 11. m•aila· 
bleat http://www.state.gov/p!whalrlsl59673.htm. Formal negotiations did not begin until 
Jbc second summil on April t8, 1998 in Santiago. Chile, and set a goal to conclude by 
January 2005. Later developments, however, completely sidetracked this process. Ma-
jor differences of opinions on intellectual property, labor and environmental protection 
issues, together with anti--dumping and agricultural subsidies create significant divisions 
and distrust among the many participating nations. In one public display or outburst, 
negotiators and stakeholders engaged in a rowdy shouting match, causing the chair to 
call in armed security guards to maintain order and cancel the meeting early. See Insti-
tute ror Agriculture and Trade Policy, Looking toward the Free Trade Area of the Amer-
icas, 3 NAFf A & l l'l'rJ<:R·AM.BRICAN T l\AVti MoNrroR. no. 7, AprilS, 1996, aYailable aJ 
hn p:/lwww.hartford- hwp.com/archives/401212.html. See aLso Mario E. Carranza, 
Mercostu and Jhe End Game of the FT AA Negotiations: Challenges and Prospects Afttr 
the Argentine Crisis, 25 TmRI> WoRLO QuARTE RLY 319, (2004), available at http:J/ 
www-e.uni-magdeburg.dclcvans/Journai%20Librarytrrade%Wand%20 Countries/Mer 
cosur%20and%20the%20end%20gamc%20of%20the%20FT AA.pdf. 
152. This primarily refers 10 the so-<:alled "ASEAN Plus One" and "ASEAN Plus 
Three" processes. respectively, all centered on China. For the former, a Comprehensh•e 
Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement between China and ASEAN was con-
cluded and came into effect on January I, 2010. For the Iauer, Japan and Korea are 
invired to join in lhe hope that the Regional Comprehensive Economic Pannership 
Agreemenl will truly rake shape. See ASEAN. Choinnon's StatemenJ of the 13th 
ASEAN Pita Three Foreign Ministers' Meeting, July tO, 2012, available at http://www. 
asean2012.mfa.gov.khnpage:detail&arlicle=302&1g=en. 
153. USTR. Trade Faw: United Suues 10 Negotiate Porticipati()n in Trans-Pacific 
Strategic Economic Partnership, September 2008, available at http://www.ustr.gov/sitesl 
defaullffilesluploads/factsbeetsl2008/ asset_upload_file660_1 5 11 6.pdf~ The While 
House. Remarks by Pmidtnl Barack Obama OJ Sumory Hall, PRESS REUiASE, Novcm· 
ber 14, 2009, available at http:J/www.wbitchousc.gov/the·press·orfice/ remarks-presi-
dcn t·ba rack -obam a-sun tory-hall. 
154. Copied from the ACT A negotia<ions. the practice or the USTR is tha< all nego-
tiators, supporting staff. and the 600 or so "stakeholders·-. domestic and international, 
1nust sign a non-disclosure agreement. No draft rext or any kind will be made available 
to the public at all. The legislators being .. s tonewalled" include Senate Finance Com-
miuee•s Subcommittee on lnternarional Trade, Customs and Global Competitiveness 
chainnan Ron Wyden (D·Oregon) and House Oversight Committee Chairman Darrell 
lssa (R·California). For Senator Wyden, the USTR simply denied his request to access 
any documents. including the drafl text of the agreement, concerning TPP; for Con-
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unexpectedly, it immediately generated strong criticisms from both 
houses of U.S. Congress, calling for more transparency of the pro-
cess and prior consultation with Congress.155 Several watchdog 
groups and legal scholars also weighed in, expressing their disap-
pointment over the direction the negotiation process has taken, ar-
guing that the present process was "a stealth attack on democratic 
governance," and urging the U.S. government to aUow more public 
input instead of keeping a tight lid within an inner circle of interest 
groups.•s.s Internationally, the more secretive process also results in 
gressman Jssa, the USTR politely rejected his requesL to participate as an observer in 
the 13th round ofTPP negotiations, held in June 2012 in San Diego, which happens to 
be his prescient. See Zach Carter, Obama Trade Documt!nf Leaked, Revealing New 
Corporale Powers and Broken CampoigtJ Promises, HUI·l'I.NUmN Pos-r, June 13,2012, 
available at http://www.huffingtoopost.com/2012106113/obama·trade-documcnt·leak_n_ 
1592.593.hlml. 
t55. A bipartisan group of 134 members of the House of Representatives jointly 
issued a letter to the US'f'R on June 27, 2012. In addition to raising serious concerns 
over the lack of transparency, it further states: "Specifically, we write to urge you and 
your staff to engage in broader and deeper oonsultation.s with members of the full range 
of committees of Congress whose jurisdiction touches on the wide-ranging issues in-
volved, and to ensure there is ample opportunity for Congress to have input on critical 
policies that will have broad ramifications for years to come."' Su Vicki Needham, 
House Democrats Press for Details on Asia-Pacific Trade Deal, Tm~ Hru., June 27, 
2012, available at http://thehill.com/blogs/on·tbe-money/IOOS-tradcfl35181·house-<lem· 
ocrats-press-for-details-on-asia-pacific-trade.<Jeal. Realizing the letter apparently fell on 
deaf ears. e<ght frustrated n~<>mbers of O>ngress wrote another letter to the USTR in 
August but still to no avail. Sa Offit:e of Congresswoman Rosa deLauro, House Demo-
crats Call 011 Administratinn to Open Trade Talks, PRESS RFLP.A'iH, August 28, 2012, 
available at http://delauro.house.gov/index.php?option=oom_content&viewaarticle&id 
~ 1 057:house-democrat:s-call .. on~administration·to..apen·trade~talks&catid.a2:2012-presr 
release&ltemid~2t; for text of the letter, sec htlp://delauro.hoose.gov/imagcs/08%2029 
%2012%20TPP%20Letter%20to%20Ron%20Kirk.pdf. On the Senate side, four mem· 
bcrs issued a letter Lo the USTR, suggcsling thai the non-transparent nature of the 
negotiations will result in the legitimacy of the final agreement being called into ques-
tio•L Noticeably they are all Democrats hokJing key positions in the Senate. See omoe 
or Senator Sherrod Brown. Wilh Tra11s-Pacijic Partnership NegotiJltions Set to Cominut 
in Cahfomia Next \Vuk, Senators Cn/lfor Increased Transparency, /nclttdi11g BTOQdtr 
Consultarion on lmemet Frudom, PRESS RI::.LEA.Stt, June 25, 2012, available at hnp:l/ 
www.brown.senate.gov/newsroomlpresslrelease/with•trans-pacific-partnership .. negotia-
tions·set·to--continut·in·caHfomia~next-week·scnators-call·for·increascd·transparency· 
including·broader~onsultation-on-inlemet-£reedom. 
156. Program or loJormation Justice and IntelleCtual Property, American University 
Washington College of Law, LAw l'rofessors Calling for Trans-Pacific Partnership 
(TPP) Transpare~~cy. INromsm·.,.oRc., May 9. 2012. available at http://infojustioe.org/ 
archives/21137. Thirty-six Jaw professors from the Paci(IC Rim countries jointly signed a 
letter sent to the USTR. Although Ambassador Kirk. the incumbent USTR, did send a 
••preliminary response·• immediately, it was received rather negatively. Su Mike Mas-
nick, USTR l11Sults tile lmel/igence of Legal Scho/OI'S after 17~ey Chal/engt Him on Lock 
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frustration and criticism from participating members such as New 
Zealand, arguing that the lack of transparency and public input in 
such a massive undertaking will negatively impact a very large por-
tion of global trade. 1s1 
3. The Negotiation Authority 
In addition to the issue of transparency, another potential risk 
to this U.S.-Jed trade negotiation is that, as in the case of ACI'A 
negotiations, the U.S. negotiators came to the table again without 
the "Fast Track" or "Trade Promotion Authority" authorization 
from Congress. Thus the USTR adopted the same strategies as in 
NAFTA and ACT' A negotiations, hoping that the TPPA will be, at 
best, treated as a congressional-executive or statutory trade agree-
ment rather than as a treaty, hence requi ring the approval by the 
majority vote of each house rather than by two-thirds vote of the 
Senate, thereby avoiding a much more difficult congressional scru-
tiny and legislative process.158 Major controversies also surround 
the USTR proposal to further expand the so-called investor-state 
of TPP Transparency, T"<:HDIRT BJ..(>G, May 9, 2012, available at hup://www.lechdirt. 
oom/a rt icles/20 120509/0945051884 7/ ustr -i nsu lis-in tell igence-legal-scholars-afl er -they-
challenge-him-lack-tpp-transparency.shtml. 
157. ACTA v. TPP: The Case for Tron.sparency in lmemosional Tre01y NegoiUuions. 
T1:cu LIIU:!.R1"V NZ, December 5, 2010, available a1 httpJ/Icchlibcrty.org.nz/acta-vs-tpp-
the-case-for-transparency-in- international-treaty-negotiations/. Among some of the 
leaked documents, one paper submitted by the New Zealand delegation clearly shows 
the nation's reservation for going beyond the regime provided by the TRIPS Agree~ 
ment. It was particularly concerned about imposing legal liability for DRM infringe~ 
ments. See TPP: lmellectuol Property Chapter: Horizontal lssues/OveroJI Structure, 
Gtntral ProvisiOnJ and Cooperation. Paper submitted by the New Zealand Delegation. 
available aJ http://www.citizcn.org/documcntsiNZicakedlPpaper-J.pdf. 
158. Here the executive branch enjoys tremendous discretion as long as it fu lfills 
certain notification and consuhacion requirement under a given statute. Made in tht 
USA Foundation v. United States, 242 F.3d 1300 (11th Cir. 2001 ), cerL denied, as United 
Steelworkers of America, et. aL v. United States. 534 U.S. 1039 (The lith Circuit held 
that whether an international commercial agreement such as the NAFTA is a treaty 
that must be approved by two-thirds of the Senate was a nonjusticiable political ques· 
tion. thereby upholding the constitutionality of the majority vote of two houses in pass· 
ing the NAFfA Implementing A<...1); Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Acto£ 1988. 
§ 1103, Pub.L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107. codi[U<d as 19 U.S.C. §2903. For the develop-
ment and analysis of the statutory trade agreementS program, see Jeanne J. Grimmett, 
Why Certain Trod~ Agreements Are ApprO\•td as Congr~ssionaf.£.recutive Agrttments 
Rallrer Than as Treaties, CoNmuo:SSIONAI. RLSb•\Rf"'l Srm.VICt1 RHIIO()RT 1·o CoNC:RhSS 
97-896. July 13. 2012, at 2·5, available at http://www.fas.org/sgplcrs/misc/97-896.pdf. 
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dispute settlement mechanism (ISDS or ISDM)'59 and intellectual 
property rights protections, demonstrated in the leaked documents, 
including the draft agreement text and some discussion noted, much 
like what had happened during the ACfA negotiations.'60 
Despite the on-going controversies, the negotiations are appar-
ently intensifying and forging ahead.'6 ' Although no conclusion was 
reached before the self-impOsed deadline correspOnding with the 
opening of the 2011 APEC Leaders' Meeting in Honolulu, Hawaii 
on November 12 and 13, 2011, the anticipated participation of Ja-
pan at the time provided added momentum to the process.162 
159. ISDS rinds iiS origin in Chapter II, Seetion 2 or the NAFTA, particularly Ani-
cle 1121, which allows an investor to completely bypass the domestic adjudieation sys-
tem in the host nation and submit the investment·related dispute to arbitration. fnitial 
design as a mechanism to avoid bia~d treatment and counter·measure in dealing pri-
marily with nationalization policy, the expanded use of this mechanism in recent years 
has ignited significant globaJ controversies. often times encroaching on the efrecth·e 
exercise and/or adjudk:ation or a nation's sovereignty. See Daniel M. Pri~ An Over-
view of the NA FT A Investment Clrapter: Substantive Rules anti lnvessor..Srare Dispule 
Seltkment, 27 I"' 'c L. 727 (1993): Note (Samrat Ganguly), Investor-State Dispute M«h· 
anism (ISDM) and a Sovereigtr'$ Power tO Protect Publk: Healt/r, 38 CowM. J. TRANS· 
NA"I''I, L. 113 (1999-2000). 
160. Big Pharma Lobbying lll/ensi'fies as USTR Signai.J IP Proposal Dt!adlilf~, 
TRANS-PAcn"c PAR-rNPRStur OIGbS"I', May L. 2011, available at hup1/tppdigest.Ofg/in-
dex.php?optionzcom_content&vieW><article& icf,.291 %3Abig-pharma-lobbying-inten-
sifies-as-ustr-sig~~al .. ip-proposal-deadline&:atidz I %3Aiatest-news&ltemicf,. I: for an 
observer's report, .rrn Krista Cox. Notes from the Seventh Round ofTPPA Negotiations 
in Vie111am, KNOWUilXJE &·oLOUY INTUtNA·noNAL Bu10, June 27.2011, Q\·ailable at 
hup://keionline.orflnode/1175 (the negotiations on intellectual property issues seem to 
be dominated by the delegations from Australia, New Zealand and the U.S., and the 
U.S. proposed text is the most aggressive). 
161. The 15th round of negotiations was conducted in December '2012, with Canada 
and Mexico participating ror the first time. No official word yet as to when the process 
is likely to conclude. 
162. Wi~t the Liberal Democratic Party (LOP) regained majority in the Japanese 
Diet (lower house of lhe parliament) and Shinzo Abe as the Prime Minister in Derem· 
bcr 2012. the prospect of Japan becoming a full participant is now highly uncertain. The 
LOP platform rejects TPP OOI.right. However, o spokesperson ror the Abe Cabinet has 
given a somewhat positive answer co the question, raising the pOSSibility that Japan may 
consider some level of involvement short or run participation to balance the pressure 
from within and without, while also using the process as a hedge on its territorial dis· 
pules over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands with China. It is also widely expected that Abe 
is not likely to make any formal announcement on this issue during his first visit to the 
United States as the Prime Minister. See Kyodo News, LDP \Viii Support Ab< on TPP 
Talks.· Takaichi, JAJ"AN TLMISS, January 13, 2013, availabl~ at http://www.japantimes..co. 
jplnewsl2013101/07/national/ldp-will-support·abe-on-tpp·talks·lakaichil. For a critical 
analysis or the TPP in its entirety (not just the intellectual property portion) and from 
the economic perspective, set Henry Gao, Tlu! Trtms·Pac;[JC Suategic Economic Part· 
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4. The IP Controversies 
Based on the leaked text of the draft TPP Agreement, it is fun-
damentally an attempt to create an elevated or "upgraded" version 
of the ACT A and, if adopted as is, a reflection of the utmost "right 
protection maxima !ism" the world has seen thus far. '63 For 
example: 
a. Accession Prerequisite 
ACTA expressly states that "[n]othing in this Agreement shall 
derogate from any obligation of a Party with respect to any other 
Party under existing agreements, including the TRiPS Agree-
ment."164 While it clarifies the relationship between ACTA and 
other existing international conventions or treaties, it does not re-
qui re the accession into any such other convention or treaty as a 
prerequisite before a nation qualifies for ACTA. The TPP draft, 
however, takes it one step further and does just that. Article 1.2 
specifically lays out 10 existing conventions and treaties that a par-
ticipating nation must have already acceded or ratified by the date 
of entry into force of the TPP Agreement.' 65 In addition, each par-
ticipating nation shall make all reasonable efforts to ratify or accede 
to the Patent Law Treaty (2000) and the Hague Agreement Con-
cerning the International Registration of Industrial Designs (1999). 
nership Agreemtnt: High Standard or Missed Opportunity?, November 2, 2009. 
presented a1 the UNESCAP AsiA-PACIHC TRAJ)E EcoNOMIST's CONI-'"I<:RCJI'('H, availa-
ble a1 http://www.unescap.org/tidlannetlmtg/2-1 Henry%200ao.pdf. 
163. The leaked text apparently was the version proposed by the USTR on February 
10, 2011 and its authenticity has been verified, although USTR would neither confirm 
nor deny it publicly. Su Trans Pacific Pannership Document Library (TI'PDL), IN FOR· 
MA·noN Ju~nn!, available a1 http:l/infojustice.org/downloadltpp/tpP"textsltpp%201P% 
20chapter%20fcb%201eak.pdf 
I 64. ACf A, art. 1. 
I 65. They arc: Patent Cooperation Treaty (I'Cf) 1979 Text, Paris Convention for the 
Protection of Industrial Property 1967 Stockholm Text. Berne Convention for the Pro-
tection of literary and Artistic Works 1971 Paris Text, Brussels Convention Relating 10 
the Distribution of Programme-Carrying Signals Transmitted by Satellite, Protocol Re-
lating to the Madrid Agreement Concerning the lnternalional Registration of Marks, 
Budapest Treaty on the International Recognition or the Deposit of Microorganisms for 
the Purposes of Patent Procedure 1980Text, International Convention for the Protec-
tion of New Varieties of Plants, Singapore Treaty on the Law or Trademarks. WI PO 
Copyright Treaty (WCf) and WI PO Performanoes and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT). 
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b. Complete National Treatment 
By mandating that all participating nations adhere to the prin-
ciple of complete national treatment, Article 1.7 of the Draft 
Agreement leaves no room for exceptions to this rule. Not even 
ACI'A have such a mandatory requirement. In contrast, earlier in-
ternational norms such as the Berne Convention, while also adopt-
ing the national treatment principle, allows the "material 
reciprocity" exception.'66 From economic perspective, this excep-
tion can indeed potentially have a significant adverse impact on na-
tions having weaker protection andlor enforcement, and the 
healthy development of their indigenous cultural and entertainment 
industries.167 Thus by changing to complete national treatment, the 
drafters apparently hope to level the playing field for all parties, 
eliminate the "hidden" domestic trade barriers and "lock in" all sig-
natories at the highest possible level of protection, at least in the-
ory. Mindful, however, that material reciprocity is allowed in cases 
where the legal situations among different states are quite diverse 
and the application of national treatment would have resulted in 
strong imbalances between countries, it remains to be seen whether 
the underlining imbalances will indeed be significantly reduced 
through such a leap-forward measure.'68 
166. Also known as the doctrine of mutuality. it means an agreement by which a 
state who n1.akes the agreen1ent agrees to eKtend to roreign nationals who are domiciled 
in their state the same legal rights that the foreign government extends to the host state 
citizens inside the foreign country. Thus Article 7.8 of the Berne Convention permits 
oomparison of terms. As a result~ while the EU now generally affords naturnl persons a 
term of copyright protection for the tife of author plus 70 years. a foreign citizen whose 
country provides a term of life o( author plus 50 years can only receh·e that same term 
or protection even in EU. See Council Directive 93198/EEC, Harmonizing tl1e term of 
protection of copyright and certain related rights, 1993 O.J. (L 290) 9; Directive 20061 
116/EC, Term of protection or copyright and certain related rights, art. 7, 2006 O.J. (L 
Jn) 12. 
167. When Congress ac1ed to extend the term of copyright protection in 1998 to 
match that of the EU, one of the main reasons was precisely to avoid potential ceo-
nomic losses to the U.S. economy, as many in the film, software and other copyright-
related induslrics were mulling the feasibility of shifting the .. first publicarion .. of their 
works to Europe from the U.S., thereby altering the existing supply chain, causing sig-
nificant re,'Cnue losses to !be U.S. market. See House Report 105452, Copyright Term 
Extension Act (1998). at 4, available at hllp:llwww.gpo.gov/fdsyslpkg/CRPT-IOShrpt 
452/pdf/CRPT·I0Shrpt452.pdf. 
168. For detailed analyses, set Silke von Lewinski, huell«tual Property, Nallonali'Jy, 
and Non-Discrimination, presented to the WIPO PANt"J DISCUSSION ro CoMMI-'.,.M~ 
RA11 ·nm S&n1 ANNtVI RSARV <W1111 UNIVI·.RSAt DH1J\RA'I'ION m- HUMAN Rao•rrs. 
November 9, 1998, ovailable at hiiJYllwww.wipo.inlltklenlhrlpaneldiscussion/paperslpdU 
lewinski.pdf; Edward J. Ellis, NaJionaJ Trttatmt!nt Under the Bl'rnt! Convention and Jht 
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c. Liability of ISPs 
Building on already one of the most controversial compOnents 
of ACT A, the TPP Draft provides that without first "expeditiously 
removing or djsabling access, on receipt of an effective notification 
of claimed infringement, to cached material that has been removed 
or access to which has been disabled at the originating site," an ISP 
will not be eligible for exemption of Jjabilities or enter the "safe 
harbor".169 This goes clearly above and beyond the scope stipu· 
lated in ACTA. 
Side Letter One attached to the TPP Draft Text further lists 
detailed formality and procedural requirements on "notification" 
and "counter-notification" concerning the handling of potential on-
line copyright infringement, agrun somethlng that has never been 
stipulated before, not even in the ACT A.' 70 They are by and large 
a wholesale export of the relevant provisions from the U.S. Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 (DMCA).'" Learning from the 
major controversies developed over the adoption of secondary lia-
bilities, i.e., contributory, vicarious and inducement liability, during 
the ACT A negotiations, the USTR trus time apparently did not use 
any language associated with these liabilities directly in the draft 
text, yet tactically and effectively embedded and covered the con-
cepts anyway through the "notice and take down" requirement to 
exempt from ISP liabilities.172 
d. Fair Use 
Prior to the 13th round of the TPP negotiations, the focus in 
the intellectual property area has been lopsided towards further ex-
pansion of right holders' protection. In a surprise move, on July 3, 
2012, the Office of USTR suddenly announced that "[f)or the first 
DOCJrine of Forum Non Conveniens. 36 IDEA 327 (1996), a val/able at http://ipmall.org/ 
hoslcd_resources/1 DEN6. Ellis. pdf. 
169. TPP Draft Text. arL 16.3 (b)(v)(B). 
170. A Side Leiter is a set of separate agreements that scn•e to clarify the meanings 
or cenain terms in the main agreement. Its function is similar to that of the Agreed 
Statements found in recent treaties such as the WCf and \VPPT and has a binding 
effect on the signatory states. 
171. Pub.L. No. 105·304, § 202 (a), 112 Stat. 2860 (1998), codified as 17 U.S.C. § 512 
(a)(3)(2006. Supp. IV)( this portion is also known as the Online Copyright Infringement 
Liability Limitation Act). 
172. Michael R. Morris, ACTA's Abandoned Third-Pony Uabiliry Provisions and 
Whar They Mean for the FuJrtre. PIJIP RL~SEARCII PArt.'!\ No. 10. AMERI<'AN UNIVFR· 
SITY WA.SIIING'ION' Cou F<~h ot· LAw (2010), available at http:l/digitalcom· 
mons. wcl.american.edu/cgilviewcontent.cgi?article= I 0 I O&context=research. 
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time in any U.S. trade agreement, the United States is proposing a 
new provision, consistent with the internationally-recognized '3-
step test,' that will obligate Parties to seek to achieve an appropri-
ate balance in their copyright systems in providing copyright excep-
tions and limitations for purposes such as criticism, comment, news 
reporting, teaching, scholarship, and research."173 
Ironically, just less than six months earlier, two similar bills 
backed by the entertainment industry, i.e., the "Stop Online Piracy 
Act (SOPA)"' 74 in the House and "PROTECT IP Act {PIPA)"'75 
in the Senate, called for broader and expanded enforcement of in-
tellectual property rights and arguably tess scope for fair use. Both 
bills eventuaUy ran into strong opposition from grassroot Internet 
users and companies like Googte, Reddit, Twitter and Wikipedia, 
among others.176 In light of the massive firestorm from Internet 
organizations and users, what seemed to be a fast and smooth legis-
lative sail initially ground to a squeaking halt.177 
173. USTR, USTR Introduces New Copyright ExceptlonJ and Limitations Provision 
at San Diego TPP Talks, PRLSS R ELP..ASE, July 3, 2012, available at hup:l/www.ustr.gov/ 
about ·Uslpress-officeAllog/20 12/j u ly/ustr.. in trod uces·new-oopyri ght -exceptions~ 1 im ita· 
tions.provision. 
174. Stop Online Piracy Act. H.R. 3261, 112lh Coog. (2011). 
175. Preve nting Real Online Threats to EA:onoonic Creativity and TheiL or lntellec-
luall>roperty Act, S. 968, I 12th Cong. (2011). This bill was the re-introduction or a bill 
in 2010 that faiJed to pass the Senate. Ste Combating Online Infringement and Counter· 
Feits Act (COICA), S. 3804, Ill th Cong. (2010). 
176. David A. Fahrenthold, SOPA Prott!Sts Slrw Down IVeb SiiU. WA.,IIINOTON 
Pos-r. January 17,2012. available at http:l/articles.washingtonpost.eom/2012-<11·17/polil· 
iesl35439450_1_web-sites-english· wikipedia·reddit. 
tn. OFfice of Senator Harry Reid (D·Nevada, Majority Leader), Reid Statemelll on 
lntell«tua/ Property Bill, PR13SS R1.:u i ASI!, January 20, 2012, at~ailable at http://www. 
reid.senate.gov/newsroom/pr_012012_ rcidstatementonintellcctualpropertybill.cfm; 
U.S. House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary. Statemem from Owimwn 
Smitlr on Senate Delay of Vote on PROTECT IP Act, January 20. 2012. p,.,;ss RELC-'-'"-
available at hllp:/(judiciary.house.gov/news/01202012.htonl?~2&sq=lamar%20smith 
&steese. The oppositi015 as well as the subsequent online and physical protests prima-
rily argue that, if enacted. the bills would have encroached on the rreedom of CX"pres-
sion (a de facto censorship by allowing the right holders to show down a blog or website 
with bare suspicion that the site may contain infringing materials), users' privacy (com .. 
pulsory disclosure of identity of users suspected for copyright infringement) and e:stab-
Jjshed in cUect an online police-state. The oppositions sucxessfully pil the high·tech 
industries against the entertainment industries. heooe greatly reducing the effectiveness 
or Hollywood lobbying. as no legislators want 10 get caught in the middle. See also 
Stephanie Condon, PIP A, SOPA Pw 011 Hold;,. IVake of Protesl!i, CBS N"ws.January 
20.2012, avallablt at http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162· 57362675-503544/pipa· 
sopa·put-on·hold-in-wake-of•proteslSI. 
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With that victory in hand, the opposition shifted its attention to 
the TPP and called for further action to sidetrack the on-going ne-
gotiations.178 Facing pressure back and forth, the USTR announce-
ment may not be seen as a complete surprise after all, at least it 
seems to suggest that the USTR may be finally heeding the public 
outcry (regardless of whether the arguments are true or false) and 
would not want to see the negotiations floundered because of what 
happened domestically and/or the second thoughts some negotia-
tors may start having on whether they should continue to support 
the U.S. proposal. t79 
A subsequent leaked TPP Discussions Draft shows that a joint 
Australia/U.S. proposal did inject the "three-step test," using lan-
guage identical to Article 13 of the TRlPS Agreement and Article 
10(2) of the WCT. 180 However, it also creates a new paragraph, and 
can r.tentially extend to areas traditionally not subject to this 
test.' ' Critics have given mixed comments. Some argue that it is 
actually more restrictive than the language appears and in effect 
encroaches on areas that are traditionally exempt from copyright 
infringement, others praise it as a step in the right direction al-
though more needs to be done.' 82 The Discussions Draft shows that 
178. Edward Black. SOPA, ACTA and the TPP: wsons for a 21st O!mury Trade 
Agenda. FoRm•s. February 29. 2012, available at hup:i/www.forbes.com/sile$/edblack/ 
2012102129/sopa-acta-and-the-tpp-lessons -for-a-21st-century-trade-agenda! (Edward 
Black is the CEO of the Computer and Communications Industry Association). 
179. Clyde Prcstowitz, Is lhe Trans-Pacific Partnuship Foundering?. FoREIGN Pol..-
•c-v, April 27. 2012, available at http://prestowitz.foreignpoliey.oom/po6tsi2012/04127/ 
is_the_transJ)acific_partnership _foundering. 
l80. With respect to copyright and related rights, .. each Pany shall confine limita· 
tions or exceptions tO exclusive rights to certain special cases that do not connict with a 
normal exploitation or the work, performance, or phonogram, and do not unreasonably 
prejudice the legitimate interests or the right holder." See James Love. uak of TPP 
Text on Copyright Limilations ond Exctptions. KNowu~oou EcOLOGY IN"I,~RNA· 
·noNAL, August 3, 2012, available at hup1/keionline.org/node/1516. 
lSI. "Subje<:tto and consistent with paragraph (I), each Party shall seek to achieve 
an appropriate balance in providing limitations or exceptions. including those for the 
digital environment, giving due consideration to legitimate purposes such as. but no 
limited to, criticism, comment. news reporting, teaching . .. •· As a result. the proposal in 
effect places what are already copyright exceptions such a.s ''criticism, comment. news 
reporting. teaching. scholarship and research .. back under a restrictive three-step test, 
thus creating more uncertainties to the balance that the negotiations seek to achieve. 
See Love. id.; cf .. Berne Convention arts. 10, I Obis. and llbis(2). 
182. Love, ld.; Peter Jasz.i, Public Statement on the U.S. PrOPQSOl for A Limitations 
and Exceptions Clause in tl~ Trans·Pacific Partnership, AMERICAN UNIVERSITY J>I~O­
ORAM ON INFORMA'l' ION Jtrsn<:E ANI) INl·t-:u.EerUAI. PRm•ERTY, Augusl2, 2012, avail· 
able at hllp:i/in£ojustice .org/wp-content/uploadsl 2012108/PIJ I P-Statemcnt-0&022012. 
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New Zealand, Chile, Malaysia, Vietnam and Brunei have tried to 
propose more open-ended exceptions but to no avail thus far.'83 
e. Criminal Penalties 
While both ACf A and TPP Draft Text mandates criminal pen-
alties against acts of copyright piracy and trademark counterfeit 
that have reached "commercial scale," TPP, again, takes one signifi-
cant step further. Under ACf A, commercial scale means "at least 
those carried out as commercial activities for direct or indirect eco-
nomic or commercial advantage."' 84 Under the TPP Draft Text, in 
addition to activities for financial gain, it further incorporates "sig-
nificant ... willful infringements that have no direct or indirect mo-
tivation of financial gain."' 85 So are intentional trade (import and 
export) of pirated or counterfeit goods.'86 
It is not clear whether the mere trade of generic products, i.e., 
products that have not yet been labeled or packaged as certain 
name brand(s), will suffice to be treated as trafficking counterfeit 
goods.' 87 If the answer is in the affirmative, then the market of 
pd[. Set also Mike Palmedo, JoinJ Sratemetrt on U.S. Trans-PacifiC Partnership (TPP) 
Proposal on Excepliot~s and Umiuuions, INPOJl1S'11CI~. August 29, 2012, available at 
http:/linfojustice.orglarchives/27049 (Arguing that "the language in Paragraph I of the 
US proposal, specifically the excerpt 'shall confine"'. limits nations' ability to seek a 
flexible exceptions and limitaliOI'lS system. This language would cause numerous poten-
tial problems for the kind of balance in copyright systems that the new USTR proposal 
claims to advance .. ). 
183. Love, id. 
184. ACTA art. 23.1. 
185. TPP Draft Text art. 15.1. 
186. /d. Even ACf A does nol have such a broad scope of acts subject to criminal 
penalties. It is primarily a reflection of \\'hat has been recommended by WHO lMPACf 
and designed to cope with the worsening condition of falsifted and substandard 
medicines on the global marketS« WHO, IMPACf Pri11ciples and Elemellls for Na-
tional L~gislation. presented at IMPACf RazmoNAL CoNni RbNCt:. ON CoMuA11NG 
CouN·n::.KI·L11' MEl)IGAL PRODUCTS (2009}, available Dl hUp:J/www.who.int/eotilyfim-
pact/ resourcesll M I' ACfPrinciplesAndELcmentsForNationaiLegislation.ppt. 
187. Article 15.2 of the TPP Draft Text provides a mandatory requirement of crimi-
nal enforcement against users of counterfeit or "illicit"' labels, even without willful in· 
fringement, as long as they are intended to be affixed to a phonogl'am, or a copy of a 
computer program, motion picture or audio work and is likely to cause confusion. In 
comparison, under U.S. law. whoever "intentionally traffics in goods or services tmd 
knowingly uses a counterfeit mark on or in connection with such goods or services • 
. . . shaiJ be fined not more than $2~000.000 or imprisoned not more than 10 years. or 
both, and. i[ a person other than an individual, shall be fined not more than $5,000.000." 
18 U.S.C. § 2320 (2006, Supp. IV). Here the U.S. Congress sought to close a loophole in 
2006 that counterfeilers transport or ship unmarked, generic goods and counterfeit Ia· 
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such goods such as generic medicines will likely be significantly im-
pacted: delay in custom inspection, insurance premium, higher 
transactional costs to meet the added burden of proof as well as 
other administrative compliance and/or legal measures.' 88 
This naturally leads to concerns over the added risk for search 
and seizure. While ACf A provides that the competent authorities 
have the authority to order the seizure of "assets derived from, or 
obtained directly or indirectly through, the alleged infringing activ-
ity[,)"189 the TPP Draft Text seeks to expand the scope of seizure to 
"any assets traceable to the infringing activity."'90 As a result, 
should this rule become final, many original equipment manufac-
turers (OEMs) of the TPP signatory states who tend to procure ex-
isting components from the spot market and reassemble them into 
semi-finished or final products will have to invest on better and 
more sophisticated systems to filter and verify the source of their 
components. In other words, they will have to establish (if none are 
in existence) or enhance (if they already exist) a due diligence pro-
gram and engage in a thorough review of their supply chain, or fac-
ing the outcome of likely delays, seizures and costly legal 
proceedings, on the transportation of their merchandise, be they 
automobiles, computers or pharmacies. Such investment will not 
be cheap, and will inevitably eat into the already slim gross margin 
for most of the OEMs, thus ironically raise the bar of entry barriers 
for legitimate products.'9 ' 
bcls or packages separately to avoid custom inspection. seizure and subsequent dam· 
ages and/or other liabilities. See Stop Counterfeiling in Manufactured Goods Act1 
Pub.L. No. 109-181. 120 Stal. 285 (2006); Priori1izing Resources and Organization for 
Intellectual Propeny Act of 2008 (PRO IP Act). Pub.L. No. 110-403. §§ 205, 206. 122 
SU!L 4256 (2008). 
188. Charles Clift, Com/xuing Counterfeit, Falsified and Substandard Medicines: De-
fining 1he Way Forward?, CnA111AM HousP B•~WI-'lNU PAPER CHBP No. 2010101. No--
vember 2010, at 4 (sidebar) and 9, ayoi/ablt (lt http://www.chalhamhousc.org/sites/ 
defaulllfiles/public/Rescarch/Giobai%20Heallh/1110bp _counlerfeil.pdf. 
189. ACfA arL 25.1. 
190. TPP Drafl Tcxl an. 15_). 
191. Gross margins \'aries due to different categories of products. consumer demand, 
competilion, product life cycle. new product introduclions, unit volumes, commodity 
a11d supply chain costs. the complexily and functionality of new product innovalions. 
among other factors. In the PC or smartphone manufacturing sector, OEMs tend to 
have single-digit gross margins, while brand names such as Apple can pull in around 
50%. Su Adrian King.sley~Hughes. Court filing: iPhone Is A Gross Margins Power-
house. ZDNI~T. July 30, 2012, ovailablt: at hup://www.zdnet.com/oourt-filing-iphonc·is·a· 
gross-margins.powerhousc· 7000001747/. 
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f. Enforcement proceedings 
In addition to granting stronger, substantive protections for 
right holders, the TPP Draft Text also tries to provide speedier pro-
cedure and more tools to help enforce their rights. For example, 
presumption of ownership and validity of inteUectual property 
rights (Article 10.2), sufficient minimum legal (or pre-established) 
damages (Article 12.4), right of the prevailing party (presumably 
the right holders in most cases) to be reimbursed for attorney fees 
and court costs (Article 12.5, without the need to prove willful in-
fringement in copyright or related rights), criminal penalties (pecu-
niary fines and imprisonment) sufficient to ensure a deterrent effect 
(Article 15.5 (a)), seizure, forfeiture and destruction of "suspected 
counterfeit or pirated goods, any related materia ls and implements 
used in the commission of the offense, any assets traceable to the 
infringing activity, and any documentary evidence relevant to the 
offense" (Article 15.5 (b)). 
They are indeed ultrahigh standards, many of which even U.S. 
domestic laws do not meet. Unquestionably for those who choose 
to accede to this agreement as-is, they will have to substantially 
amend their domestic laws and policies. As in any free trade a_gree-
ment, it is probably inevitable that some nations will feel that the 
TPP A as a whole or any free trade agreement as such is encroach-
ing on their "free will" or "sovereignty." It can be expected that the 
integration process, i.e., the accession, ratification, compliance and 
enforcement by each participant will invite quite a bit of socio-eco-
nomic adjustments, even for the more industrialized nations, and, if 
not managed carefully, result in instability and unrest.192 In the long 
run, however, if the integration can truly occur as planned, arguably 
it is likely to bring forth convergence of income and, therefore, 
more even distribution of wealth.'93 
192. Major incidents include the prolesls in Seaule, WA (WTO Ministerial Meeting, 
1999) and Seoul, Korea (U.S . .Soulh Korea Free Trade AgreemenJ, 2011). Cf see 
RAvEI:.NDRA NAlll "RAva" 8A'I'RA, T nv_ Mvnt oP FREE TRADE: A J)u\N H>R 
AMERt<'A's EcoNOMIC RIWIVAJ .. (1993)(The author opposes free trade agreemellts, ar~ 
guing.. instead. the adoption or "competjtive protectionism" which would increase tax 
revenues. resurrect the manufacturing base, raise real earnings for the great majority or 
the work force. trim inequality, reduce the rate of poverty, enhance the growth of pro~ 
ductivity, cripple the abuse of monopoly power by big business. revitalize the economy. 
and, above all, restore the U.S. economic leadership in cbe world - a highly concrover-
sia1 position). 
193. Tuc WoRU> BANK, TRAOb Bux'S 90,124-128 (2000)(The reporl is generally in 
favor of regional integration, especiaiJy the so-called North~South type or integration, 
with focus on compelition and scale as well as trade and location effects). 
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m. OUTLOOK AND CONCLUSION 
Counterfeit and pirated goods have become major problems in 
the daily socio-economic fabric of every society, rich and poor alike, 
damaging the foundation of our economic lives and even the very 
health of every human being. There is also a strong consensus that 
all nations must come together to address the root causes of the 
problem. The passage of TRIPS Agreement more or less repre· 
sented this urgent sense and marked a historic high mark for that 
cooperative spirit. 
Ironically, this high watermark has also formed the boundary 
of the major ideological divide between two massive blocs in the 
world: the developed (North) and the less developed (South) econ-
omies. The North, represented primarily by Canada, the EU, US 
and Japan (also known as the "Quad"), takes a maximalist view and 
considers the protection standards in the TRIPS Agreement only as 
the threshold or the "floor."194 The South, mainly represented by 
the so-called BRICS nations, i.e., Brazil, Russia, India, China, and 
South Africa takes a min imalist view and considers the TRIPS stan-
dards a ceiling - the highest level of protection a nation needs to 
comply with.' 95 As both sides become more suspicious of the inten-
tions and actions of the other, the ideological split often tends to 
blur and overly simplifies the substantive issues, and make it all the 
194. For lhe U.S., such view is clearly and expressly reflected in its TRIPS Agree· 
mcnt implementing statute: "A foreign country may be determined to de11y adequate 
and effective protection of intellectual property rights, notwithstanding the fact that the 
foreign country may be in compliance with the specific obligations of the Agreement on 
Trade· Related Aspects of lnlellectual Property Rights referred to in section IOI(d)(l5) 
of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act." See Uruguay Round Agreements Act of 
1994, § 313, Pub. L. No. 103-465. 10& Stat. 4809 (1994), codified as 19 U.S.C. § 2242 
(d)(4)(2010). See also. Global Intellectual Property Center, TRIPS: Floor or Ceiling?, 
January 2010, available ot http:l/www.thcglobalipcenter.com/ sites/defaultlfileslreponsl 
documentsffRIPS_FioorVsCeilin~ WP _t_I0_2.pdf (GIPC is affiliated with the U.S. 
Chamber of Commeroe). 
195. Henning Grosse Ruse- Khan, Ceiling$' in lnternationai/P Regimes: A$$eS.Sing 
Binding Limits 10 TRIPS-plus IP Protection within TRIPS and EU FTAs, presented at 
the ICTSDIWBI G1.0tMI D •A&..O<JUb ON TRIPS AND Puna.1c Pourv CuAt.J.ENCiES, 
April 16. 2009. ovoilabl• oc http:llwww.ip.mpg.delfileslpptll ccilings_presentation_gr· 
khan_l6_04_20093.ppt; Henning Grosse Ruse - Khan and Annette Kur, Enough is 
Enough - Tire Notion of Binding Ceilings in lmernatiorud lmellectu.al Property Protec· 
tioll, MAX PI.ANCK INsnnrn~ 1 OR INTI: JJ.EC'TUAI. PROPI~RTV, CoMI''"FITilON & TAx 
LAw R•.:si:AR<'II PAJ)t'tt St•RJES No. 09~0l,December 8, 2008, available a1 http:l/pa-
pers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.clm?abstracUd~ 1326429H. 
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more difficult to find common solutions, especially when empirical 
data does not clearly support one side over the other.' 96 
To make matters worse, given that some of the most serious 
sources of counterfeit and pirated products apparently originate 
from the very nations considered to have more lax legal protec-
tions, it naturally encourages the argument for a tougher enforce-
ment regime to curtail the problems.197 For many years, the U.S. 
has taken the lead role in advocating more rigorous rules than what 
TRIPS Agreement calls for at different inter-governmental organi-
zations. Once the North felt that none of the existing fora, be it 
WCO, WHO, WIPO or WTO, were functioning the way they pre-
fer, the North quickly switched their strategy, and took what a 
scholar referred to as the "country club" style negotiations amongst 
themselves in concluding the ACf A, meaning by invitation only, 
with all negotiations taking place behind closed doors.' 98 This 
seems to suggest that the North will continue to pursue a predomi-
nantly legalistic approach in tackling global counterfeiting and 
piracy problems, at least within certain "premium markets" for in-
tellectual property. In other words, the strategy of the North is to 
build up a "legal containment" with very little tolerance for other, 
more accommodating attitudes. 
On the other hand, the South has been sticking to their tradi-
tional line, arguing that the standards of the TRIPS Agreement 
would have to be the very goal, i.e., the "ceiling," that every WTO 
Member needs to accomplish within the timeline corresponding to 
their respective status or classification.'99 Otherwise these agreed 
standards would have been completely meaningless if they are 
treated only as the minimum threshold while the goals remain open 
ended. The South also tries to seize the high ground by attacking 
196. Peter K. Yu, A Tal< of Two Developm<nl Agendas, 34 Ou1o N. U. L. REv. 465 
(2009). 
197. In the case of China. fol' a thorough analysis on the complexity of the problems.. 
stte Andrew C. Mertha. The Politics of Piracy: Intellectual Property in Contemporary 
China (2005). 
198. See supra note 26. 
199. They often cile Article 415 or Lhe TRIPS Agreement as a basis of support: 
"'(1'he Part on intellectual property enforcement] does oot create any obligation to put 
in place a judicial system for the enforcement or intellectual property rights distinct 
from that for lhe enforcement of Jaw in general, nor does it af[cct the capacity of Mem~ 
bers to enforce their law in general. Nothing in this Part creates any obligation with 
respect to the distribution of resources as between enforcement of intellectual property 
rights and the enforcement of law in general.'" See also Peter Yu, fnforceme.IJI, Enforu~ 
ment, \Vhat Enforc<melll?, 52 IDEA 239 (2011). 
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the secretive processes for lack of transparency and public input, 
strongly hinting that these negotiations are the result of backdoor 
business influence and lobbying, therefore unduly tilting what 
should have been a delicate balance between the right holders and 
the public. On the other hand, China has put forward the policy of 
"indigenous innovation" to sustain its economic growth with solid 
research and development capabilities in technologies and to drasti-
cally reduce its reliance on foreign technologies to 30% by 2020.200 
Many international technology companies, however, cast a suspi-
cious light on this policy and call it "a blueprint for technology theft 
on a scale the world has never seen before."201 The U.S. Interna-
tional Trade Commission also did a full-scale study on this and how 
that may impact counterfeit trade and the U.S. economy as a 
whole.202 
While these two titanic masses are clashing against each other, 
creating fault lines from one international forum to another, the 
flood of international counterfeit and pirated goods continues un-
abated. Assuming the various trade associations and government 
survey statistics hold true, the trend is indeed alarming.203 Stronger 
legal protection has not been able to reduce the counterfeit and 
200. This policy formally origina~es from The State Council (Cabinet) of the People's 
Republic of Olina. 771e Omlint of National Medium· Md Long· Tenn Science and 
TechMiogy Development Plan (2006-2020) (commonly known as MLP), [2005) GUO 
Fa No. 44, available at http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2006-02109/ content_l83787.htm (full text 
in Chinese only)~ for an introduction and basic analysis of this policy. see WANO Yan, 
China's National Innovation System and Innovation Policy (2006), presented at the 2NI> 
ASIA·PAcrnc FoRUM ON NIS POR Hl(iii·LHVEI~ PouCY·MAKERS, availabfe a1 http:// 
nis.apett.org/PDF/ CSNWorkshop_Report_P2S2_ Wang.pdf. Mr. Wang was the Direc-
tor of Regulations and Intellectual Property Rights ( IPR) Division, Department of Pol-
icy and Regulations. Office or Innovation System Construction of the Ministry of 
Science and Technology, China at the time. 
201. James McGregor, China's Drive for "Indigenous Innovation": A Web of Indus· 
trial Policies (September 2, 2011 ), at 4, available at http://www.uschamber.com/sites/ 
def au lt/fileslreports/1 00728ch i nareporLO.pdf. 
202. USITC, China: Effects of Intellectual Property Infringement and ltuligenmu In· 
IIOVOiion Policies on the U.S. Economy {May 2011), availabk at hllp://www.usitc.gov/ 
publications.l332/pub4226.pdf ("'Indigenous innovation policies are relatively new and 
evolving; only a small percentage or U.S. IP-intensive firms that conduct business in 
China reported that they had already experienced material losses due to such policies in 
2009. Going forward, most firms either are unsure how their revenues will be affected 
by indigenous innovation or anticipate that their revenues will fall"). 
203. /d.; see also, e.g., International Intellectual Property Alliance (IIPA), Special 
30/: WriJten Submission R~garding 1he ldetllification of Coull/ries Under Sec/ion 182 of 
Jhe Trade Act of 1974 (February 15, 201 1), available at hnpJ/www.iipa.com/rbc/20111 
2011 SPECJOI COVERLE1TER.pdf. 
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piracy trade. On the contrary, the problem is worsening. The rapid 
development of technologies, for instance, especially those concern-
ing the Internet, has been identified as a major contributing factor. 
However, experiences suggest that a single factor can hardly be the 
only cause of problems of this magnitude and it clearly shows the 
industry's lagging reaction to the new world order. It also suggests 
that legal containment alone will not do the work. This counterfeit 
and piracy "flood," just like flood water, would have to go some-
where (most likely underground) if not properly drained and 
guided. 
An important short-term solution is the reform of licensing or 
subscription mechanisms, especially for massive online reproduc-
tion , distribution and performances of copyrighted materials. The 
market bas already shown that different content is moving rapidly 
into portable or mobile digital formats and data processing is shift-
ing to so-ca lled "cloud computing." This means the convergence 
and integration of audio-video files, graphics, digital books or li· 
braries, social media and other interactive applications into a highly 
personalized and unique format tailored to the need and preference 
of each individual user.204 Therefore, the definition of certain copy-
right terms and their relevant licensing mechanisms clearly requires 
innovative reforms so that people are truly incentivized to acquire 
and enjoy copyrighted content though legitimate licenses or sub-
scriptions.205 In this regard, the current one-size-fits-all approach 
that has been more or less applied by most multinational companies 
may not be the right solution after all. 
Before the negotiations of the ACTA, one of the primary 
objectives among the participating parties was the hope to develop 
204. Mark R. Nelson, Digital Content Ddil·~ry Trends in Higher EducoikJn, Ctw ru( 
101~ AI"''UEI> RFSEARCII (ECAR) RESEARO t B u u .P.TIN (April25. 2006). available at 
hllp://net.educause.edu/irllibrnry/pdf!ERB0609.pdf; Lauren lndvik, 5 Fresh DigiJa/ Me-
dia Tre11ds 10 Watch, MAsttAI:JI..C BuSINESS, March 3, 2011, available aJ hup:/lmashable. 
com/2011/03/03/digital-media-trendsl. 
205. In Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121 (2nd Cir. 
2008), cert. denied, 561 U.S. _, 129 S.Ct. 2890, 174 LEd.2d 595 (2009), the U.S. appel-
late rourt held that to determine whether a work is .. fixed" in a given medium, the 
court will ask not only (1) whether a work is .. embodied" in that medium, but also 2) 
whether it is embodied in the medium ••ror a period of more than transitory duration ... 
In other words, time or duration is now an element the oourt must inquire in determin-
ing whether reproduction has indeed taken place. Note that the court dealt with direct 
infringement issue only in this case. Had the court ruled otherwise, the entire business 
model of Cablevision (the defendant) and the future of cloud computing may be in 
serious jeopardy. 
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a new plurilateral (not traditional multilateral) model with common 
appeal that cuts across all regions and economic states so that it can 
also be attractive to states such as China and India, traditionally the 
major sources of global piracy.206 With the conclusion of the 
ACT A, however, it appears to have created just the opposite result, 
driving developing nations away and making them even more suspi-
cious or outright hostile, at least for now.207 The phenomena of 
growin!ios patent and copyright litigation involving so-called 
"trolls" and the staggering costs has generated further hostilities 
toward the legalistic approach and rendered the adoption of a 
"TRIPS plus" regime by developing economies all the more diffi-
cult, if not impossible. 
In addition to licensing reform, other managerial and technical 
means should also be applied and complimented, albeit very care-
fully, to achieve a more comprehensive, more multi-faucet solution, 
such as tackling the production, distribution, finance and organiza-
tional aspects of a counterfeiter's supply chain.209 In the area of 
online piracy, various technical measures have been implemented 
to ensure users are using legitimate copies or to protect unautho-
rized circumvention. However, one has to be particularly mindful 
206. Andrew Willis, EU Defends FitUJI ACTA Tw on Counterf<iting, July 10,2010. 
EUOn.c;,r:RVl~R.C'OM, available 01 http:J/euobserver.com/871/30976; Dave Neal. A cr A Is 
Worthless Withow Chinese Jnvo/vemenl, Was Always Worthless Anyway, INOU IIU!Jt, 
October 7, 2010. available at http://www.theinquirer.net/ lnquirer/news/1741186/acta-
worthlcss-chincse-involvement. 
207. WfO TRIPS Council, Minules of Meeling on June 8·9, 2010, IP/C/M/63, Oclo-
bcr 4, 2010, al n 248-336, available at htlpJ/docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocumenlSilfiP/ 
C/M63.doc. 
208. A troll is originally a supernatural being in Norse mythology and Scandinavian 
folklore. generally used as a negatjve synonym for a jOtrmn. an obnoxious or even dan-
gerous being to human lives. In the intellectual propeny area, the term was used pejo· 
ratively since the 1990s £or people engage in aggressive law suilS but the metaphor was 
popularized in 200l by Peter Deckin. former assistant general counsel of Intel, in 
describing an entity or individual who does not engage in research or development but 
only purchase or license patents or other intellectual property rights to aoquire financial 
gains through litigation or the threat of litigation. Although these type of entities and 
individuals do exist, a precise definition has been diffiCult, if not impossible, due to its 
uncertain nature. For detailed discussions, see Patent Trolls: Fact or Fiction?, Hearing 
before !he Subcommiuee on Courls, the ln1eme~ and lnlelleclUal Properly of lhc Com· 
miuee of tlle Judiciary, U.S. House of Repre$Cnlalives, 109lh Cong. (June 15, 2006). 
209. Marlin J. Schneider and Michael Stephen, E:.tploring tht Supply Sid< of COim-
terftiting: Strategies, ln.stmmenls and Capabilities of Counterfeiters, presented to the 6th 
Annual CoNn•RENCE OP'I'IIE EuROPEAN Pourv FOR JN111J.l.I!C'nJAl. PROJ'I-lRTY Asso .. 
<'11\TION, September 8·9, 2011, avai/obl~ at http:l/www.cpip.cuf confcrenceslepip061pa· 
pcrs/Parallei%20Session%20Papers/SCHNEIDER%20Marlin.pdf. 
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and careful about applying them on acCJ!SS comml. For example. 
Sony's placement of highly intrusive DRM software on all of its 
mu~ical COs in 2005 created a disastrous worldwide backlash 
against that company before long. lto The music industry quickly 
learned from this error and the four major record labels eventually 
and completely abandoned DRM on all the optical disks they re-
leascd.211 Book publishers soon followed suit by abandoning DRM 
on all audio books.212 
No matter how good the intention may be, any type of "stop 
and check~ process on the identity or legitimacy of users is likely to 
be filled witb trials and errors. Given the speed of distribution and 
demand, any online measure that tends to burden a product's or 
service's legitimate end users can easily create unforeseen back-
lash.2" Consequently, the product or service providers should 
210. Since August I, 2003, Sony IJMG beg;tn to sell some ofil> mu"cal CD lilies wilh 
the so called "conlcnl protection .oltware" being packaged ln. Specifically, Sony BMO 
adopted Jhe MediaMaJ< and "c,Jcndcd copy protection." or XCP software in those COs 
whiCh only allows users to make a ltmoJcd number of copoes front the disk and also rip 
tbe mu.i<: into a digital r.,.. .... to be U>ed by • computer or portahle music pla}·er. 
Wben an XCP CD is iruocrtcd onto a computer, for eumrlc, an End User License 
A~n:cment (EULA) appcanautomatocall) on tbe screen and tbe XCP !loftware installs 
obcll on tbe t.tSCr's oomputcr. Al~ly tht> sofiVo'a<C COOrtlatna a po<enttally harmful 
.. rootkit'" Yriaich DXllliton the uter·, aQt\llieS and sig,nab back to the manufacturer. It, 
tbercforc, opens up the computer's "l><ockdoor" and render ot much nt(lre vulnerable to 
th1rd parry hacking (either w1th .. m:.dware, .... spyv.,are ..... Trojan hones- or other types 
of hacking dcvi«si!Oftworc). Sony RMG eventually idcnllfied 52 tot I<• using the XCP 
sortware and more than 20 million or COs have been recalled. All parties eventually 
settled by the end or 2005 with Sony agreed to provide a si1111ificont cash payout and 
free downloads from its musicol archi\le, but serious damag~ to Sony's rcputatjon were 
already done. Tlte stocL procc for Sony also fell sharply .., a result. Stt 111 rt So11y 
8MG CD T<dutologon Ltllgatitm, No. OS.CV-1>9575 (NRB)(S.I).N.Y. 2005). For the 
le<t of the settlement agreem.:nt, ..... ht!p11 .. '0W.girarcl$ibiJo.eomJ>On)><IIJernentagtce-
llk:nt.pdf. 
211. Catherine Holahan, .  l(>n~ BMG Pllllu to Drop DRM· TN t.ut 11!4jor /sb<l •-rll 
thro• ,. 1h~ 101<-d on dJgiiJJI nKhtJ mtiMI/I'mnttltnd prqNJI't'd to fi~ht Appk for >'IIIIMIIM 
do" nlood rnvnues. 81 .,,M '' W1 t k.-. January 4. 2(K)8. lll'flllabl~ t11 hupllwww.businc:ss-
"'cek.com/tcehnologyloontenUJ•n200Ritc20080t3_398 TIS.htm Many companies a.tso 
learned that the technology wa~ not \'Cry effecth·e after all and can orten be circum-
vented within relatively short period or time, causing more embarm~srnent. 
212. Brad Stone, P11blishtr.f Pluue 0111 Piracy Protecti01o 011 A11dio Books. N.Y. 
ToMo '· March 3, 2008, at , ovai/t1blt ill http1/www.nylim<:s.contl20081031031bu>inesslme· 
doa/0:\audiobook.html. 
213. E.g., Chiroesc Rage Agaitut Microsoft$ Black xr«n Coomttr/~il NOli«, 
Kc)\otJ'\XI~ INTI::J..I.IGI Nc:'l cc,'"'' c .,, ·~ NO\'c:mbcr 9. 200R, ·~··ll.lbk Ill http:Jiwww. 
lona•i..eomlindex.pbp(20111!11092J~:nc"' hig)Hceb-<>Ompulcr·"'ft,.an:·onte....,t<hinal 
chonaoe·rage-apinst-mtaoooft•-I>Ja.:L«reciHlOUnterfat·nOCI<>e.html. 
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learn from past experiences and try very hard not to "rock the 
boat,~ so to speak, i.e., avoid disturbing the very foundation and 
source of their support and focus on the management of their sup-
ply chain instead. 
History has clearly shown that whenever there is a new tech-
nology or technological platform emerging, showing strong poten-
tial to replace the existing one(s), making copying and distribution 
easier and more perfect than ever, instead of embracing the 
changes and meeting the challenges for the uncertainties, content 
providers based on existing technologies or platform(s) tend to 
hold on to their base, panic and then pursue the legal route 
(through legislation or litigation) to preserve their vested interests 
and sometimes stymied the progress on the new technologies.214 In 
that process, the legislature or courts from time to time breaks the 
fundamental principle of technology neutrality and start regulating 
the technology itself. This tends to dichotomize and ideologize the 
position of both sides, and create more confrontation and mistrust 
instead of reconciliation. Thus the South views the ACf A and the 
on-going TPPA negotiations as the U.S. government's wholesale ef-
fort to export its legal system, and has launched strong resistance 
and counter-measures to battle these efforts every step of the way, 
covering every major international forum. 
This backlash apparently hit home when the EU Parliament 
rejected ACf A by a large margin. With the apparent foundering of 
ACf A, international attention has now shifted to TPP. Together 
with the China-led RCEP and the recently announced Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership (ITIP) negotiations between the 
U.S. and EU,2'~ a three-way clash involving these three titanic trade 
blocs may be forming. An alarming possibility is that, through 
these intensifying regional integration efforts and with the WTO 
Doha Round in limbo, a premium market will be created within the 
global economy, undermining the U.S. and EU's willingness to par-
214 Benton J Galfoe). Notes and Comment<. Cop)rrght Swtut-s That ReyuiMt 
TtcJumiORJ· A Comparatn't Analysis oft~ A•~dio 11om~ Rrtordmg Att and tM Digital 
Milltnnwm Copynght Act. 75 WA.<JJ. L R1 v. 611 (2000). 
215. l'hc While House, SUJJemt>.mfrom Unit~d Stattl Prtsidtmllarnck Oboma. Euro-
fH!OtJ Cou"c'l Prr:udent H~rmiJ/1 Van Rompuy and £uro~an Commission Prts1dent JMI 
Manut'l /JarroJo, Ptu~ Ru.t:.ASh. February 13, 2013. a"mlablt at http://www. 
wh i teh ou~c .gov/t h e-prc~s-ofrice./2013/02113/sta t e men t ·Unit cd-M a lc~·prcside n t-ba rack-
obama-curopcano(.'QUncil-ptesiden. 
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ticipate in the multilateral system, and reduce the overall effective-
ness of the WT0.216 
While major content providers and technology developers are 
constantly locked in the classic legal warfare in the late 1990s and 
early this century, Apple, on the other hand, managed to success-
fully bring the two together and completely revolutionize the distri-
bution of music and the way of life for the human being. Hilary B. 
Rosen, former president of RIAA (1998-2003) and the initiator of 
the record industry's hard line legal campaign against thousands of 
online copyright infringers, offered what may well be one of the 
most sobering yet enlightening observations: 
" ... knowing we were right legally really still isn't the 
same thing as being right in the real world. We had that 
euphoria with the first Napster decision .... The result was 
lots of back and forth and leverage hunting on both sides 
and continued litigation and then a great service shut 
down to make room for Jess great services. And more le-
gal victories didn't bring more market control no matter 
how many times it was hoped it would .... The euphoria 
of this decision does not and should not change the need 
for the entertainment industry to push forward and em· 
brace these new distribution systems. . . . I hope all sides 
will take a deep breath and realize that this Supreme 
Court decision doesn't change one bit their responsibility 
to move forward together on behalf of their consumer."2 11 
Thus, regardless of what is happening on the legal front, with 
technology and content development not necessarily on a collision 
course, it is important to note that one way or another, it is the 
market and our attitude, not the courts or the legislature or major 
trade blocs, which will ultimately decide the shape of our future. 
216. See supra note 193, at I 04. 
217. Hilary B. Rosen, The Wisdom of the Court, Part 11. Tue HunlNOTO.N fo.\1·, 
June Zl, 2005, availobl< at htLp:l/www.huffingtonpost.com/hilary-rosen/the·wisdom-of· 
the-court·p_b_3259.html (reOecting and commenting on lhe music induslry·s victories 
in the cases of A&M Records, Inc. v. Napstu, Inc. , 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001) and 
MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, l..Jd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005), involving unauthorized peer-
to-peer file share). 
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ABAC 
ACPl 
ACfA 
APEC 
ASEAN 
BASCAP 
"BRICS" 
DIIP 
DMCA 
DRM 
ECPA 
EU 
FAA 
FTAA 
FTAAP 
FTAs 
G8 
GCCCP 
GMP 
HDP 
ICC 
IIPCAG 
IMPACf! 
INTA 
INTERPOL 
IP 
IPR 
ISDS/lSDM 
ISMA 
LOP 
MBA 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
APEC Business Advisory Council 
Anti-Counterfeiting and Piracy Initiative under 
APEC 
Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
Business Action to stop Counterfeiting and Piracy 
Initiative of the International Chamber of Com· 
merce 
Brazil, Russia, india, China and South Africa 
Database on International Intellectual Property of 
INTERPOL 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 (United 
States) 
digital rights management 
European Crop Protection Association 
European Union 
Federal Aviation Administration 
"Free Trade Area of the Americas" 
"Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific" 
free trade agreements 
Group of Eight 
Global Congress Combating Counterfeiting and 
Piracy 
good manufacturing practice 
Heiligendamm Dialogue Process under GS 
International Chamber of Commerce 
Intellectual Property Crimes Action Group of 
INTERPOL 
International Medical Products Anti-Counterfeiting 
TaskForce 
International Trademark Association 
International Crime Police Organization (a/k/a 
ICPO) 
intellectual property 
intellectual property right 
investor-state dispute settlement mechanism 
International Security Management Association 
Liberal Democratic Party of Japan 
Model Bilateral Agreement on Mutual Customs 
Assistance 
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MOFA 
NAFTA 
OECD 
P3-CEP 
P4 
PECC 
PIPA 
RCEP 
RIAA 
SECURE 
SOPA 
SPLT 
STOP! 
TlFAs 
TIIP 
TPPA 
UN ESCAP 
UN 
USTR 
WCP 
WCT 
WHO 
WIPO 
WPPT 
WTO 
Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
North American Free Trade Agreement 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development 
Pacific Three Closer Economic Partnership 
Pacific Fo11r 
Pacific Economic Cooperation Co11ncil 
"PROTECT IP Act" 
Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership 
Recording Indllstry Association of America 
Customs for Uniform Rights Enforcement 
"Stop Online Piracy Act" 
WIPO Substantive Patent Law Treaty 
Strategy for Targeting Organized Piracy (STOP!) 
Initiative 
trade and investment framework agreements 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement 
United Nations Economic and Social Commission 
for Asia and the Pacific 
United Nations 
United States Trade Representative 
World Customs Organization 
WIPO Copyright Treaty 
World Health Organization 
World Intellectual Property Organization 
WIPO Phonograms and Performance Treaty 
World Trade Organization 

